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PLURALISMS:
THE INDIAN NEW DEAL AS A MODEL
DALIA TsuK*
I. INTRODUCTION
At least since Oliver Wendell Holmes substituted an emphasis
on the social and political nature of law for the depiction of law as an
autonomous body of natural and neutral rules,1 legal scholars have
struggled with the pluralist dilemma: given the plurality of competing
visions of what law ought-as a social and political matter-to be, to
allow the state to exercise its power over diverse groups risks
imposing one set of concededly partial interests and beliefs in the
name of a general, public good; on the other hand, the alternative of
deferring to groups risks moral relativism, maybe even nihilism.
2
Recent attempts by political, cultural, and religious groups to exercise
their rights to self-determination have brought the pluralist dilemma to
the forefront of legal thought. Legal scholars and policymakers
around the world are today attempting to develop legal mechanisms
that would accommodate the unique interests of diverse group while
also mediating and settling potential conflicts and tensions between
individuals, groups, and peoples.
* Copyright © 2001 by Dalia Tsuk, Associate Professor of Law, James E. Rogers
College of Law, University of Arizona; Ph.D. Candidate (History), Yale University; S.J.D.,
1999, Harvard Law School; M.Phil (History), 1998, Yale University; LL.B., 1992, Tel Aviv
University. I thank the organizers of this symposium for inviting me to present my work and
the participants for their comments. I also wish to acknowledge the assistance I have received
in connection with this project from the archivists at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the
Joseph Regenstein Library (University of Chicago), Sterling Memorial Library (Yale
University), and the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library (Yale University). For their
comments and suggestions, thanks are also due to the participants in the inaugural Willard
Hurst Legal History Institute at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, to Kathleen Hale and
Elizabeth Townsend, and to members of the editorial board of Margins, especially Toby
Treem. All errors remain mine.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, Address at the dedication of the
new hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L.
REv. 991 (1997); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 4, 139-42 (1992); Robert W. Gordon, The Path
of the Law after One Hundred Years: The Path of the Lawyer, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1013
(1997).
2. Cf Daniel R. Ernst, Common Laborers? Industrial Pluralists, Legal Realists, and
the Law of Industrial Disputes, 1915-1943, 11 L. & HIST. REv. 59, 60 (1993).
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This article adds to these endeavors by examining federal
Indian policy during the 1930s and 1940s, a period commonly labeled
the "Indian New Deal," as an earlier attempt to create such
mechanisms-as an earlier attempt to form a pluralistic state. In doing
so, I hope to unravel a set of forces that are highly relevant to
contemporary endeavors, but that traditional accounts of attempts to
devise a pluralistic polity often ignore. Specifically, I propose that we
can better understand different endeavors to develop legal mechanisms
that would accommodate cultural, political, and religious diversity by
exploring their relationship to contemporaneous intellectual visions of
the state. I further suggest that different images of the state are
interlaced with particular conceptions of individual and group identity.
To illustrate, let me summarize my argument with respect to federal
Indian policy during the New Deal.
The Indian New Deal was a major milestone in the history of
federal Indian law. United States Indian policy at the turn of the
twentieth century sought to break down tribal organization and force
all Indians3 to assimilate, particularly through the distribution of
communal lands to individual owners. 4 The essence of the Indian New
Deal, at least as policymakers described it, was to stop land allotment
and assimilation by delegating to Indian tribes more authority over
their economic, social, cultural, and political affairs.
5
In retrospect, the Indian New Deal has been subject to
conflicting judgments. For some scholars, federal Indian policy during
the New Deal was not a break from the past, but rather another stage in
the history of colonialism. Accordingly, the New Dealers6 were white
imperialists who imposed their theoretical framework on Indians.
7
Similar concerns are raised today with respect to any attempt to
"liberate" indigenous peoples or to devise a pluralistic polity. 8 For
3. Given the historical nature of this article, I use the terms "Indian" and "Indian
tribes" rather than "Native Americans" or "Indian nations."
4. See infra section II.A.
5. See infra section II.B.
6. The term "New Dealers" in this article refers to officials in the Department of the
Interior, particularly those in the Solicitor's Office, who administered the Indian New Deal.
7. See, e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of
Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963 (1996) [hereinafter Deloria, Reserving to Themselves].
8. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615 (1992); S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian
People and International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing
Wrongs, 28 GA. L. REv. 309 (1994); Russel Lawrence Barsh, Current Development: United
Nations Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and States, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 599 (1989); Rebecca
Tsosie, Privileging Claims to the Past: Ancient Human Remains and Contemporary Cultural
Values, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583 (1999); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Frontier of Legal Thought III:
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other scholars, the Indian New Deal reflected a genuine attempt to
establish self-governing Indian communities that failed due to political
compromises and the policy of termination that was adopted during the
1950s.9
This article argues for the significance of a set of forces that
these traditional accounts of the Indian New Deal neglect. It proposes
that we can better understand the Indian New Deal by viewing it as
one of several experiments undertaken during the early decades of the
twentieth century intended at creating a pluralistic state. I further
show how this attempt to devise a pluralistic polity was influenced by
theories of pluralism that public philosophers had been articulating
since the turn of the twentieth century.' 0 These theories explored the
role of the sovereign state in accommodating the unique interests of
diverse groups. While I do not intend to overstate the effects of
philosophy on law, I mean to suggest that theories of pluralism were
among the factors that affected federal Indian policy during the 1930s
and 1940s. I also demonstrate that theories of pluralism were
grounded in different conceptions of identity."
To underscore the relationship between law, pluralism, 12 and
identity, this article investigates the Indian New Deal from the
perspective of its chief legal architect-Felix Solomon Cohen, who is
Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of
Indigenous Peoples Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660.
9. For these diverse opinions, see INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRST HAND ACCOUNTS OF
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (Kenneth R. Philp ed., 1995)
[hereinafter INDIAN SELF-RULE]; and THE STATE OF ,NATIVE AMERICA: GENOCIDE,
COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE STATE OF
NATIVE AMERICA]; and compare Deloria, Reserving to Themselves, supra note 7, with VINE
DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 187-206 (1985) [hereinafter DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN
TREATIES].
10. This article is part of a larger project in which I examine the development of theories
of pluralism in the twentieth century, the interdependence of the different meanings attributed
to pluralism in distinct historical moments, and the relationship between theories of pluralism
and the emergence of the modem welfare state.
11. This is not to suggest that only images of the state and conceptions of identity
affected the outcomes of the Indian New Deal. As will be developed in this article, political
compromises and constraints derived from the nature of legislative processes were important
factors. I focus, however, on theories of pluralism and conceptions of individual and group
identity. Cf ELMER R. RUSCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT (2000).
12- I use the term "pluralism" as a noun to refer to a commitment to devising a
pluralistic polity. As I suggest in this article, in particular historical moments, individuals
assigned different meanings to this commitment. Hence, when I refer to interpretations of
pluralism, or to models of pluralism, I am concerned with changing understandings of the
commitment to devising a pluralistic polity, or with different models that sought to create such
a polity.
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also widely recognized today as one of the most important legal
philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century.13 Cohen joined
the Department of the Interior in 1933 to help draft the Indian
Reorganization Act (1934) (IRA), 4 which initiated the Indian New
Deal by creating a procedure to reestablish tribal governments on
Indian reservations. Many present-day tribal governments were
formed under the IRA. In 1941, still in government service, Cohen
authored the Handbook of Federal Indian Law,' 6  the first
comprehensive treatise on Indian law. In 1946, a year before he left
the Department, Cohen helped to draft the Indian Claims Commission
Act (ICCA),17 which established a commission to settle tribal land
claims against the federal government.' 8  Today, similar claims are
litigated around the world by indigenous peoples.
This article shows that for Cohen, the IRA and the ICCA
reflected different models for devising a pluralistic polity. I label these
models "socialist pluralism" and "comparative pluralism,"
13. This article is an adaptation of a chapter in my book, ENCOUNTERS WITH PLURALISM:
THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF FELIX S. COHEN (forthcoming) [hereinafter TSUK, ENCOUNTERS
WITH PLURALISM]. On Cohen's legal philosophy, see also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 183;
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIICLE) 86-87 (1997); Joel R.
Cornwell, From Hedonism to Human Rights: Felix Cohen 's Alternative to Nihilism, 68
TEMPLE. L. REV. 197 (1995); Stephen M. Feldman, Felix S. Cohen and His Jurisprudence:
Reflections on Federal Indian Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 479 (1986); Martin P. Golding,
Realism and Functionalism in the Legal Thought of Felix S. Cohen, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1032
(1981); and Jill E. Martin, The Miner's Canary: Felix S. Cohen's Philosophy of Indian Rights,
23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 165 (1998-99). For Cohen's activities once in the Department of the
Interior, see FELIX S. COHEN: A FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE (Theodore H. Haas ed., Washington
D.C. Chapter of the Alumni of the City College of New York, 1956); and Symposium: Felix S.
Cohen, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 348 (1954). See also Jill E. Martin, "A Year and A Spring of My
Existence ": Felix S. Cohen and the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 8 W. LEGAL HIST. 34
(1995); Remarks at a Testimonial Dinner for Felix Cohen, held in Washington D.C. (Jan. 17,
1948), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 92, Folder 1470, Yale Collection of Western Americana,
Beinecke Library, Yale University [hereinafter Testimonial Dinner for Felix Cohen]. For
Cohen's writings, see THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN (Lucy
Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) [hereinafter THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE].
14. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79); see also
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 223-25 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000)
(1975) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY].
15. § 16, 48 Stat. at 987 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476); see also DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at 224-25.
16. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW WITH REFERENCE TABLES AND
INDEX (U.S. G.P.O. ed., 1941) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
17. Ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). The ICCA was formerly codified at sections 70-70v-
3 of the United States Code, until omitted from the Code upon termination of the Commission
on September 30, 1978. Act of Oct. 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-465, § 2, 90 Stat. 1990 (providing
for the dissolution of the Commission); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, supra note 14, at 231-33.
18. § 1, 60 Stat. at 1049; see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra
note 14, at 232.
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respectively.' 9 Each model brought early twentieth-century theories of
pluralism to bear upon federal Indian law. By examining Cohen's
scholarship, correspondence, and memoranda, I show how the IRA
and ICCA recorded and helped to shape theories of pluralism. While
both acts ultimately failed to achieve the goals they were set to
accomplish, they imprinted upon the body of federal Indian law the
promises and pitfalls of particular images of the pluralistic state .2
Drawing on Cohen's personal experience as a Jewish
American, this article further demonstrates that the IRA and the ICCA
reflected not only different images of the pluralistic state, but also
particular conceptions of identity. I argue that Cohen's approach to
the "Indian problem" and to pluralism, more broadly, was mediated
through his experience as a son of a Jewish immigrant to the United
States. I suggest that Cohen-the Jewish American-naively viewed
federal law as a tool for remedying collective traumas, particularly the
Indian trauma of colonization, or forced inclusion. Underlying this
understanding of the law was Cohen's personal relationship to
American law as a means for ameliorating the Jewish trauma of exile,
or forced exclusion. The trauma that law inflicted, even as it sought to
remedy past injuries to particular communities, was thus repressed.
Similar constraints continue to impede contemporary attempts to
devise a pluralistic polity, as different others (ethnic, religious,
cultural, and political groups) struggle both to escape law's violence
and to come under its protection.2'
19. In a previous article I have shown that the Handbook of Federal Indian Law
reflected yet another model for devising a pluralistic polity, a model I labeled "systematic
pluralism." Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 189 (2001) [hereinafter Tsuk, The New Deal Origins ofAmerican Legal Pluralism].
See also infra section III.C and section IV.B. It is important to note that these models did not
explicitly address the relationship between groups and individuals within and outside group
boundaries. Thus, although the relationship between groups and individuals is always implicit
in discussions of the status of collective entities, I do not expressly examine this issue in this
article. See also infra section III.A.
20. While the Indian New Deal is the particular experiment discussed in this article, I
wish to emphasize that my focus is the history of pluralism. The models that Cohen devised
were imprinted upon federal Indian law. Yet, they were not necessarily effective on, Indian
reservations. Cf Rebecca Tsosie, American Indians and the Politics of Recognition: Soifer on
Law, Pluralism and Group Identity, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 359 (1997) (discussing the unique
status of Indian tribes with respect to conceptions of group rights). My interest in these
models focuses on the lessons they tell about our ongoing commitment to pluralism and our
ability (personal and collective) to embrace diversity as a constitutive element of our society.
21. On the relationship between law and trauma, see Shoshana Felman, Forms of
Judicial Blindness: Traumatic Narratives and Legal Repetitions, in HISTORY, MEMORY AND
THE LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1999). See also Robert M. Cover, Violence
and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601 (1986), reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:
THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995).
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The article proceeds as follows: part II narrates the story of the
Indian New Deal as it has been traditionally told. Using Cohen's
scholarship, part III places the Indian New Deal within the broader
intellectual history of American pluralism, while part IV examines the
appeal of pluralism to Cohen, the Jewish American. My argument is
not limited to Cohen's particular experience. My goal is to call
attention to aspects of statutory drafting and policymaking that are
often left unexplored. Specifically, I wish to emphasize that legislative
and administrative attempts to accommodate the unique interests of
diverse groups are particular sites in which images of the state and
conceptions of identity are both recorded and shaped. By explicating
the impact of these unexplored forces on the New Deal legislation, I
hope this article offers a model for critically thinking about
contemporary endeavors to devise a pluralistic polity and about ways
out of the pluralist dilemma.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Federal Indian Policy on the Eve of the New Deal22
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Indian
tribes were at the outer boundaries of American society. Until the
mid-nineteenth century, white settlers sought to push Indian tribes
westward and made no attempt to integrate the tribes into Anglo-
American society. Unlike other minority groups, Indian tribes were
regarded as "distinct political communities" with limited
sovereignty. 23  Yet, Indians' efforts to maintain their tribal
organizations often proved futile in the face of military conquest,
fraudulent or unfulfilled treaties, and the pressure of white settlement
22. The following is a sketch of federal Indian policy at the turn of the twentieth
century. For a more complete account, see Rusco, supra note 11, at 1-61.
23. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.). See generally
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (discussing the role of law and the western
legal system in rationalizing the colonization of Indians); L. Scott Gould, The Consent
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996) (describing
the changing nature and extent of tribal sovereignty); Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton,
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV.
1251 (1995) (discussing the changing relationship between the federal government and
American Indians); Robert A. Williams, "The People of the States Where They Are Found Are
Often Their Deadliest Enemies ": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights and
Federalism, 38 ARmZ. L. REV. 981 (1996) (comparing the traditional legal narrative to its
Indian counterpart).
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that forced them away from most of their lands24 and ultimately onto
reservations.25
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the federal
government embraced a policy that legalized the disintegration of
Indian ways of life. Beginning in the 1870s, government officials
stressed the need to assimilate all Indians into American society. The
General Allotment Act of 1887 (the Dawes Act),26 which articulated
this new policy of assimilation, targeted Indian tribes' communal
holding of property. Grounded in classical legal thought and in a
particular image of masculinity, the Dawes Act equated freedom with
individual possession of property;27 it sought to force assimilation and
disintegration of tribal organization through the distribution of
communal lands to individual owners.28 As Richard Hart has recently
noted, "the Act was meant to force Indians to cease their tribal ways,
to become individual farmers on small plots of lands, and thus to open
the remainder of U.S. Indian reservations to non-Indian use.",2 9 The
turn of the twentieth century thus witnessed the reduction of many
24. E.g., GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, 1934-45, at 1-3 (1980).
25. E.g., Rusco, supra note 11, at 1.
26. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-54); see also
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY supra note 14, at 170-73.
27. See Yuanchang Lee, Rediscovering The Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian
Law, 27 N.M. L. REV. 273, 277-85 (1997). On possessive individualism and masculine
identity, see MARK E. KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA
(1991). On the relationship between classical legal thought and private property, see
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 145-67; and see also Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and
Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) (showing how, despite the rhetoric of private property,
Indian property was not protected).
28. E.g., TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 1-5.
29. E. Richard Hart, Foreword to INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 9, at 6, 8. Vine
Deloria, Jr. has explained that railroad companies sought lands across the continent for their
tracks and for settlements along their lines to ensure the use of the railroads to ship agricultural
produce to both coasts. DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 9, at
188. The Dawes Act institutionalized the concept of "wardship." Under section 5 of the Act,
the federal government would hold title to allotted lands for twenty-five years "in trust for the
sole use and benefit" of the allottee. After twenty-five years, the property laws of "the State,
or Territory where such lands [were] situated" would apply as to descent and partition. The
federal government, through negotiation with the Department of the Interior, would purchase
any surplus, nonallotted lands and hold the purchase money in trust for the sole use of the
possessor tribes. However, Congress was authorized to appropriate money "as it saw fit" for
the "education and 'civilization' of tribal members. Ch. 119, §5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 348); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, supra note 14, at 171-72. As Tadd Johnson and James Hamilton noted, "by imbuing
American Indians with respect and reverence for white American institutions," assimilationists
believed "the American Indians could be made happier, wealthier, and wiser." Johnson &
Hamilton, supra note 23, at 1257.
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tribal governments "from unalloyed internal sovereigns to virtual
nonentities. "30
A series of laws that were passed during the first decades of the
twentieth century sought to enhance Indian assimilation, first, by
giving individual Indians their "pro rata share" of tribal funds, and,
then, by granting them "American" citizenship. 31  Indians were
presumably welcomed into the polity, but only as long as they
relinquished their tribal ways.32
The cumulative impact of these early twentieth-century
policies was disastrous. Outlining the failures of the allotment policy,
the 1928 "Meriam Report" 33 described "poverty, disease, suffering,
and discontent" among Indians. 34  Between 1887 and 1932, Indians
lost two-thirds of what remained of their lands to white exploitation.35
30. Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 283,
292 (1997).
31. The 1907 Lacey Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant to individual
Indians control of their "pro rata share" of tribal funds. Ch. 2523, 34 Stat. 1221 (1907)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 119); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY, supra note 14, at 208. The 1917 "Sells Declaration" sanctioned a variety of measures
meant to swiftly accomplish the absorption of Indians into the nation. Indian Commissioner
Sells, A Declaration of Policy, Extract from the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, October 15, 1917, in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at
213-15. The 1919 Citizenship for World War I Veterans Act conferred citizenship on every
veteran who so desired. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 350 (1919); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at 215. The Snyder Act of 1921 expanded the powers of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) "to expend congressional appropriations for most reservation
activities, including health, education, employment, real estate administration, and irrigation."
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 23, at 1258; see also Ch. 115, 42 Stat. 208 (1921) (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 13) (providing an "Authorization of Appropriations and
Expenditures for Indian Affairs"); DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note
14, at 215-16. Finally, the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act declared "all non-citizen Indians born
within the territorial limits of the United States ... to be citizens of the United States." Ch.
233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1401(b)); see also DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at 218.
32. See generally WALTER BENN MICHALES, OUR AMERICA: NATIVISM, MODERNISM,
AND PLURALISM 30-31 (1995). On federal Indian policy during the first decades of the
twentieth century, particularly the 1920s, see also Larry A. DiMatteo & Michael J. Meagher,
Broken Promises: The Failure of the 1920's Native American Irrigation and Assimilation
Policies, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1997).
33. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION
(Lewis Meriam et al. eds., 1928); see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY,
supra note 14, at 219-22.
34. Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 23, at 1258 (quoting the Meriam Report). While
criticizing the administration of Indian policy as inefficient and paternalistic, the Report
recommended, nonetheless, a policy of assimilation that would encourage self-sufficiency. Id.
For an innovative discussion of the problematic economic nature of allotment, see Michael A.
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 685-87 (1998).
35. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 5.
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While theoretically in possession of considerable property, including
land, many Indians were, in reality, paupers. 36 Few became successful
farmers or ranchers, a fact that helped to deepen social and political
divisions on reservations. 37  The distribution of tribal lands also
hastened the disintegration of many tribal governments or at least
forced them to alter their traditional structures.38 Finally, assimilation
was never really offered; Indians were given citizenship but were
denied the rights of citizens, including the right to vote, access to local
schools, or the right to serve on juries.39
By the late 1920s, the principal actors in the field of Indian
policy were critical of the policy of allotment.4 ° With the coming to
power of the New Deal administration, federal Indian policy was ripe
for change. Shortly after his appointment in the spring of 1933, John
Collier, the new Commissioner of Indian Affairs, denounced land
allotment as a violation of tribal sovereignty and vested rights that
Indians had secured in previous treaties in return for much of their
lands. Instead, Collier pledged the moral and legal obligation of the
federal government to stop land allotment and to act upon the bilateral
contractual relationship that it had created before 1871 with Indian
tribes. 41 Collier wanted the New-Deal legislative program to promote
such an agenda.
B. The Indian Reorganization Act, 1934
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana and Representative
Edgar Howard of Nebraska, chairmen, respectively, of the Senate and
House Committees on Indian Affairs, introduced an initial draft of the
new legislation in mid-February 1934. It was a long and complex bill,
covering forty-eight pages, and divided into four titles: Indian self-
36. [Felix S. Cohen], Draft of Address by [the New Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior, Nathan] Margold, Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 1, Folder 13, Yale Collection of
Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University [hereinafter Draft of Address by
Margold]. My attribution of this Draft to Cohen is based on its content and style and on
memoranda identifying Cohen as the author. Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 1, Folder 13, supra.
37. Rusco, supra note 11, at 56.
38. Id. at 57. No clearly stated policy toward Indian governments existed. Furthermore,
as tribal governments did not disappear, the BIA was at times "forced" to acknowledge their
existence and deal with them, rather than with individual Indians. See generally id. at 1-34.
39. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 36.
40. See generally Rusco, supra note 11, at 62-93.
41. Kenneth R. Philp, Introduction: The Indian Reorganization Act Fifty Years Later
[hereinafter Philp, Introduction: The Indian Reorganization Act Fifty Years Later], in INDIAN
SELF-RULE, supra note 9, at 15, 16-17.
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government, education for Indians, lands, and the court of Indian
affairs .42
The draft expressed the general view that Congress should
abandon the breaking down of tribal organization and the assimilation
of individual Indians as the objectives of its Indian policy and instead
should encourage tribal self-government.43  The draft was rather
enabling when discussing tribes' internal powers but more
constraining with respect to tribes' economic powers. Lands
classification, purchase of lands, transfer of titles, leasing of lands-in
other words, the external scheme within which self-government was
allowed-were to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.44
Overall, the New Dealers wanted to maintain control over tribal
42. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 19-21. The first title, Indian Self Government, declared
the right of tribal societies to control their lives by establishing their own governments. It
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant "powers of local self-government and the right
of incorporation for economic purposes upon petition of one-fourth of the adult Indians
residing on a reservation and ratification of the charter by three-fifths of the residents." Id. at
20. Such local governments could then establish and enforce ordinances, "contract with the
federal government for public services," regulate membership, and "take over other
administrative functions deemed suitable by the secretary of the interior." Id. The title left
room for the institution of tribal constitutions, which would be the task of the Department in
the following years. In general, the first title aimed at transforming informal Indian processes
into formal-and western-institutions, which the federal government would-and could-
respect. The second title, Special Education for Indians, announced that educational policy
would emphasize the value of Indian culture. Government schools would aim to bring to
Indian communities a sense of their own past and values. The title thus created a fund for
formal education of Indians and different measures to "restore traditional Indian cultures." Id.
at 21. The title also provided for training for Indians "to take over service positions in the
[BIA]." Id. The third and most controversial title prohibited future land allotments and
restored to tribal ownership those lands which had been declared surplus under the respective
allotment acts but never settled. All lands allotted under the Dawes Act were to be classified
into productive units. "Those allotments could then be exchanged for shares in the tribal
corporation, while heirship lands would be ceded to the community and the individual heirs
compensated for improvements." Id. at 20. The Department of the Interior was also
empowered to purchase lands for the tribes. It could spend up to two million dollars annually
for land purchases for existing reservations and for the creation of new colonies for landless
Indians. Id. at 20-21. The fourth title called for the establishment of a Court of Indian Affairs
that would consist of seven justices "appointed by the president with the consent of the
Senate." KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, 1920-1954, at
143 (1977) [hereinafter PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM]. The Court
was to have authority over all legal controversies affecting Indian tribes. Id. It was to "protect
the Indian community ... against unnecessary obstruction and delay in carrying out of the
program contemplated in this bill ... [and afford] effective protection of the rights of
individuals in the administration of the program." TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 21.
43. E.g., Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory
Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14 ALASKA L. REv. 353, 363-65
(1997).
44. See TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 19-21, 30.
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governments so they could ensure a careful reconstruction of
weakened self-governance capacities.45
Because the Roosevelt administration endorsed the bill,
Commissioner Collier assumed that Congress would quickly approve
it. Yet, the passage was not smooth. Not only did most members of
the House and Senate committees object to the complexity and length
of the initial draft, they also favored assimilation. Apparent Indian
opposition to the bill further influenced their negative response. The
New Dealers were thus forced to appeal to the Indians. In an
unprecedented move, they summoned Indian congresses around the
country where they explained the bill and listened to suggestions.46 A
second draft followed, leaving intact the major elements of the original
47draft, but including thirty amendments suggested at these congresses.
Among other things, these amendments abandoned a provision that
mandated a transfer of allotted lands from living individuals to tribal
control and modified a provision for transferring such lands to the tribe
upon the death of the allottee. They further prohibited "the disposition
of any community or tribal assets without the consent of the tribe or
community," and specifically protected water rights.48 Finally, the
Indians insisted on including a provision to prevent a few active voters
from binding an entire tribe.
49
The second bill did not fare better than the initial draft. Collier
was thus forced to accept a new and drastically abbreviated bill, which
would become the IRA. This curtailed bill included most of the
original ideas with respect to the termination of allotment, tribal
incorporation and organization, and employment of Indians by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).50 Furthermore, the bill authorized an
annual appropriation of 250,000 dollars to help tribes draft
constitutions, bylaws, and charters of incorporation, and it created a
ten million dollar "revolving credit fund" to support economic
development on reservations. In addition, the Indian Civilian
Conservation Corps helped to bring Indians under different New-Deal
relief programs; two policy statements guaranteed Indian religious
freedom; states where Indians had enrolled in public schools were
45. See generally Outline of Bill on Indian Self-Government (ca. 1934), Felix S. Cohen
Papers, Box 9, Folder 120, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale
University. For Collier's vision, see Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 23, at 1258-59.
46. Rusco, supra note 11, at 245-49; PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN
REFORM, supra note 42, at 145-54.
47. Rusco, supra note 11, at 248.
48. Id. at 248 (quoting the House Committee, Readjustment ofIndian Affairs (1934)).
49. Id. at 249; see generally id. at 220-49.
50. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 27-28.
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given federal funds; and an Indian Arts and Crafts Board was
established.5'
Yet, the bill diluted the ability of tribes and the Department of
the Interior to acquire allotted lands in order to consolidate. Tribes
were also denied the power to take over heirship lands. Collier would
later claim that losing those features was "a major disaster to the
Indians, the Indian Service, and the program." 52 Furthermore, the final
draft of the IRA called for a referendum to be held on reservations
included under the Act within one year (subsequently extended to two
years) to determine whether a tribe chose to come under the provisions
of the Act. Tribes that rejected the IRA would remain under the BIA's
direct control, while tribes that accepted it could prepare a constitution
to be ratified by "a majority of the Indians on a given reservation and
officially recognized members of the tribe." 53 The establishment of a
tribal council and a charter of incorporation would follow. The time
limit of the referenda requirement put an undue burden both on the
Indians and on the Department and produced mistakes that might have
otherwise been avoided.5
4
The New Dealers rushed to administer reorganization.
According to one report, during the first year of the IRA, "172 [Indian
groups] with a total population of 132,000 accepted reorganization and
73 with a total population of 63,000 rejected it."' 55  After the initial
referenda were administered to meet the two-year deadline, the New
Dealers started drafting constitutions for the different tribes. 56  A
51. Id.; see also Philp, Introduction: The Indian Reorganization Act Fifty Years Later,
supra note 41, at 17-18; DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at 229-
30.
52. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 28 (quoting JOHN COLLIER, THE INDIANS OF THE
AMERICAS 265 (1947)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 27-28; see also PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, supra
note 42, at 158-60.
55. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 32. Numbers vary in different reports, but the pattern
seems accurate. But see Russel Lawrence Barsh, Another Look at Reorganization: When Will
Tribes Have a Choice?, INDIAN TRUTH, Oct. 1982, at 4. The most significant rejection
occurred on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona and New Mexico. While the BIA attributed
the defeat to campaigns carried on by special interest groups, the vote probably reflected the
bitter controversy between the BIA and the Navajos over stock reduction, a controversy that
coincided with the referendum. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 33.
56. The basic administrative framework was complete by the end of 1936. Indian
groups were enrolled in the program, formal procedures for tribal organization were
developed, and units were created within the Department to oversee the process and to
coordinate the different political and economic programs for the Indians. The Indian
Organization Division was such a unit. It supervised the preparation of constitutions and
reviewed the operations of newly established councils. In addition to lawyers, Collier brought
in anthropologists from the Smithsonian Institution's Bureau of American Ethnology and from
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model constitution was prepared and teams were sent to the
reservations to discuss general and particular provisions with the
Indians.57 Some tribes chose to follow their own traditions; others
substituted American-style constitutions for their Indian antecedents.
As Graham Taylor concluded, "[b]y the middle of 1937, sixty-five
tribes had established constitutions and thirty-two had also ratified
corporate charters. Altogether, between 1936 and 1945, ninety-three
Indian groups set up tribal governments, and seventy-four of them had
business charters. All but seven of the tribes were organized before
1938, indicating the intensity of the effort.",
5 8
In general, the IRA fell short of most of its political and
economic aims. The Act stopped allotment, but because the transfer of
lands from individual to tribal ownership was voluntary, and as
appropriations for land consolidation and purchases were restricted,
the federal government had a limited degree of control over Indian
economic resources. As a time limit was imposed on the referenda,
many Indians were rushed-maybe even coerced 59-into "a system of
organization with which they were unfamiliar." 60  Others found their
powers limited.6' In retrospect, even Collier was disappointed, noting:
"We had pressed the democratic philosophy not too far; we had not
pressed it far enough nor skillfully enough."' 2
universities. In 1936 "an Applied Anthropology Staff was established within the [BIA] under
H. Scudder Mekeel, formerly of Harvard University." TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 36-38.
57. In his recent analysis of the legislative process of the IRA, Elmer Rusco noted that
"nothing in the IRA was designed to impose any particular structure of government on an
Indian society." Rusco, supra note 11, at 296. While the IRA on its face did not adopt one
structure, as this article suggests, individual policymakers shared certain sets of beliefs that
determined their vision for the IRA and its administration. See infra section Ill. B and section
IV.A. For model constitution and bylaws, see Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 7, Folder 100, Yale
Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
58. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 36; see also id. at 30-36.
59. See Floyd A. O'Neil, The Indian New Deal: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE,
supra note 9, at 30, 42.
60. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 31.
61. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 55.
62. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 31 (quoting JOHN COLLIER, FROM EVERY ZENITH: A
MEMOIR 224 (1962)). For a critical evaluation of Collier's role in forcing Indian tribes to
come under the IRA, see Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-Determination and Subordination: The
Past, Present, and Future of American Indian Governance, in THE STATE OF NATIVE
AMERICA, supra note 9, at 87, 95-98.
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C. The Indian Claims Commission Act, 1946
The settlement of tribal land claims against the federal
government presented an important hurdle on the path to Indian self-
government. As already noted, throughout the nineteenth century,
Indian tribes lost most of their lands to non-Indian settlement.
Because the United States as a sovereign could not be sued until it
waived its privilege, Indian tribes could not protect their lands in
courts. The establishment of the Court of Claims in 185563 did little to
change the situation as an 1863 provision removed from its jurisdiction
all claims against the federal government arising out of treaties with
Indians. 64 In the early twentieth century, as an increasing number of
tribes pressed for a resolution of their claims, Congress passed a series
of special acts granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear
individual tribes' cases. Congress did not rule on these cases; rather, it
waived its sovereign immunity and allowed individual tribes to bring
their claims.
65
In 1928, the Meriam Report66 recommended the establishment
of a fairer and more efficient device to resolve Indian land claims
against the federal government.67 In its third title, the original draft of
the IRA aimed to prohibit future land allotments and to restore to tribal
ownership those lands which had been declared surplus under the
respective allotment acts but were never settled. In 1945, when
William A. Brophy took office as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he
declared as one of his goals the creation of a tribunal for hearing and
determining Indian land claims against the federal government. 6 8 The
ICCA was passed in the late summer of 1946, establishing the Indian
Claims Commission.
69
63. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491-
1509).
64. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, §9, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
1502).
65. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Indian Claims Commission, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra
note 9, at 151, 151.
66. INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, supra note 33.
67. Wilkinson, supra note 65, at 151-52.
68. James E. Officer, Termination as Federal Policy: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-
RULE, supra note 9, at 114, 118.
69. Several bills that were introduced in Congress during the late 1930s and early 1940s
shifted the attention from the need to establish a formal court to the goal of setting up a
commission. As Vine Deloria, Jr. recently noted: "[tihe investigatory commission appeared to
be the only feasible vehicle for handling claims which involved history and anthropology as
much as they involved legal theories." DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES,
supra note 9, at 221. The Indian Claims Commission was patterned after the Pueblo Land
Board. TAYLOR, supra note 24, at 149-50.
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Different policy tides made the passage of the ICCA possible.
Many legislators thought that the resolution of Indian claims would
help to terminate the special status of Indian tribes by removing "a
major barrier to federal withdrawal," and by promoting the economic
self-sufficiency of the tribes that would receive awards. Others
supported the adjudication of Indian claims as a matter of fairness to
the Indians.7 °
Reflecting this ambivalence of legislators, the remedies
provided by the ICCA were limited. While public announcements
declared that all Indian claims would receive serious consideration,
strict limitations were imposed on the remedies that the Commission
could offer. 71 The ICCA provided only for "the fair market value of
the land at the time of the taking, without interest, and it could not
restore land to Indians under any circumstances., 72 Despite a flood of
cases (over 600 were docketed by 1951), "in 1959 only $17.1 million
in restitution had been paid, and throughout the 1960s, the average
award was approximately $500,000." 73  The Indian Claims
Commission continued to hear cases until 1978, when its docket was
transferred to the United States Court of Claims.
74
Like the IRA that helped to reestablish tribal governments
while simultaneously forcing many tribes into an unfamiliar system of
government, the ICCA provided some compensation to certain tribes,
but failed to resolve tribal land claims.75  Scholars continue to have
mixed evaluations of the IRA and the ICCA. For the most part, their
analyses focus on the place of both acts in the broader story of race
relations in American history. Part III of this article argues for the
importance of a more complex narrative. It examines the ways in
which both acts recorded and helped to shape a particular discourse in
American intellectual and cultural history-pluralism.
By placing the IRA and the ICCA within the broader narrative
of American legal pluralism, I do not mean to suggest that the acts
70. Officer, supra note 68, at 118; see also RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 125 (1980).
71. Officer, supra note 68, at 118; see also Wilkinson, supra note 65, at 152.
72. Mark A. Michaels, Indigenous Ethics and Alien Laws: Native Traditions and the
United States Legal System, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1578-79 (1998).
73. Id.; see also MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF
GERONIMO VS. THE UNITED STATES (1997).
74. The Commission was terminated on Sept. 30, 1978, turning over sixty-eight pending
cases to the United States Court of Claims. Ward Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother:
Struggles for American Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary United States, in
THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA, supra note 9, at 139, 147.
75. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian
Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453, 468-70 (1994).
MARGINS
were the dependent variables, and theories of pluralism the
independent ones. Rather, while theories of pluralism influenced the
intellectual setting of the early twentieth century-including the New
Dealers' policies that arguably sought to improve the situation of
Indian tribes by allowing them to exercise more authority over their
cultural, economic, and political affairs-these theories were also
shaped by different attempts to devise a pluralistic polity.
While my analysis in the following sections is limited to Felix
Cohen's changing interpretations of pluralism, I see Cohen as a
representative of a generation of young reformers. Like many second-
and third-generation Americans, he joined the New Deal
administration to help create a "pluralistic state"-a state, which
Cohen and his colleagues viewed as composed of multiple loci of
participation and representation. For Cohen, Indian reservations were
such locations. As his story will show, the opportunity to bring
theories of pluralism to bear upon national policy was transforming,
causing a re-envisioning of the nature of the pluralistic polity and of
the role of law in helping to shape it. While both the IRA and the
ICCA ultimately failed to achieve the goals they were set to
accomplish, they imprinted upon the body of federal Indian law both
the promises and the uncertainties of different images of the pluralistic
state. As part IV will show, such visions were interlaced with
particular conceptions of individual and group identity.
III. PLURALISM
A. Pluralism on the Eve of the New Deal
At the turn of the twentieth century, after the trauma of the
Civil War, amid heightening social conflict produced by immigration,
urbanization, industrialization, and the decline of religious assurance, a
young cohort of intellectuals came to challenge the ideology of
American exceptionalism. 76  Abandoning "the idea that America
occupied an exceptional place in history, based on her republican
76. See DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE xiii-xv (1991);
HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 9-10; see also GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR:
NORTHERN INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION (1965); THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF AUTHORITY (1977); Louis MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
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government and economic opportunity, '' 77  young philosophers
searched for a new philosophy to fit the changing American
temperament. 78 "[T]he American spirit," Jean Wahl explained at the
time, "was on the look for a new faith, a philosophy wherein there
would meet and blend together ... an idealist conception and the will
for practical action, the eagerness after individual effort and the sense
of mightier realities in which individual souls are, as it were,
immersed., 79 They found pluralism.
Pluralism, especially as developed by William James, insisted
on the plurality of things, as given in experience, and on the
impossibility of a single law to traverse all the various domains of
being. 80  A pluralist theory of knowledge insisted on the multiplicity
(whether limited or infinite) of knowers in the world and various forms
of knowledge or truth,81 none of which could claim epistemological
primacy.82 In ethics, pluralism implied the existence of a variety of
competing ends, among which policymakers had to choose. American
democracy was accordingly the outcome of constructive change which
resulted in individuals ideally considering all interests when making
political decisions. "Values were 'objective' because they were inter-
subjectively verifiable." 83
77. Ross, supra note 76, at xiv; see also HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 10.
78. See BRUCE KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS, 1890-1930, at xx (1977); see also DANIEL J. WILSON, SCIENCE, COMMUNITY,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY, 1860-1930 (1990).
79. JEAN WAHL, THE PLURALIST PHILOSOPHIES OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 101 (Fred
Rothwell trans., The Open Court Co. 1925).'
80. Id. at 317-18.
81. This characterization is based on Hilary Putnam's interpretation of pluralism.
Putnam traces pluralism to Kant. According to Putnam, in the third Critique and in Kant's
postcritical writings, one can see more than "the simple dualism of a scientific image of the
world and a moral image of the world." HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION
30 (1995). There is, Putnam argues, "a tendency towards genuine pluralism, which Kant
perhaps resisted, but which nevertheless surfaces in his work." Id. Particularly, according to
Putnam, one can see in Kant's writings "various interactions between these two [images] and
various spinoffs-spinoffs that come from the interdependence of the moral image of the
world and the scientific image of the world ... spinoffs that come from the interaction of pure
practical reason with sensibility and inclination, and so on." Id. Thus, Putnam argues, Kant
began "to speak not only of a moral image of the world and a scientific image of the world,
but also ... of a religious image of the world ... and ... aesthetic images of the world, and also
of legal images of the world, and so on." Id. at 30-31. However, Putnam continues, in spite of
Kant's "incipient pluralism," Kant maintained that only the scientific image of the world
contained what might properly be called "knowledge." Id.; see also WAHL, supra note 79, at
155 (discussing William James's pluralism).
82. See NELSON GOODMAN & CATHERINE Z. ELGIN, RECONCEPTIONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND
OTHER ARTS AND SCIENCES 24-25 (1988).
83. KUKLICK, supra note 78, at 510. This argument draws on an examination of the
works of Ralph Barton Perry. Though not a self-proclaimed pluralist, Perry, whose Thought
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Pluralism had much in common with pragmatism. Both
approaches substituted empiricism, particularism, indeterminacy, and
uncertainty for rationalism, universalism, determinacy, and certainty.
84
Pragmatism, especially as espoused by James, emphasized that the
understanding of reality was mediated through experience. It was a
theory of truth that sought to redefine reality according to
experience. 85 Pluralism focused on the complex nature of reality. Not
only was our conception of reality mediated through our individual
experiences-as pragmatism suggested-but reality was also, for each
one of us, one and many at the same time.86 Individuals had "separate
ideas of the chair, of the table, of the pew." 87 They had "an idea of
them all together. Yet this last idea [was] not made up of the former
separate ones-it [was] a genuine unit, in which the separate ones
[were] parts. The separate ones [were] independent of it and [were]
not independent of it-and so on."88
Pluralism's focus on the relationship between the one and the
many appealed to Progressive thinkers; it resonated with visions of the
modem state that did not succumb to conservative individualism or to
radical collectivism. 89  During the early decades of the twentieth
century, James's students and followers thus transformed his pluralist
philosophyw-his discussion of forms of knowledge and the
relationship between the one and the many-into arguments about
democracy and national identity. Political theorists found in James's
philosophy a solution to rapidly changing social and economic
conditions, particularly, the rise of big corporations, labor agitation,
and growing disparities of wealth and income. If, as James argued,
"[t]he pluralistic world [was] ... more like a federal republic than like
and Character c/William James (1935) is still one of the best commentaries on James, was an
ally, rejecting idealism in ethics in favor of a more pluralistic theory of values. See RALPH B.
PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE: ITS MEANING AND BASIC PRINCIPLES CONSTRUED IN
TERMS OF INTEREST (1926); see also KUKLICK, supra note 78, at 255, 409, 441-42, 505-15.
84. For a similar characterizing of modernism and postmodernism, see Roderick A.
Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism, 15 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69, 71 (1998).
85. E.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING: POPULAR LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY (1907).
86. E.g., WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE: HIBBERT LECTURES AT
MANCHESTER COLLEGE ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN PHILOSOPHY (University of Nebraska
Press, 1996) (1909) [hereinafter JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE].
87. Horace M. Kallen, A Pluralistic Universe: Professor James on the Present Situation
in Philosophy, BOSTON EVENING TRANSCRIPT, June 16, 1909, at 26 (book review).
88. Id.; see also Hilary Putnam, James's Theory of Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO WILLIAM JAMES 166 (Ruth Anna Putnam ed., 1997).
89. Cf Ernst, supra note 2.
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an empire or a kingdom," 90 then, political pluralists argued,
sovereignty could not be absolute. Rather, sovereignty was distributed
among different political groups, such as churches, trade unions,
neighborhood groups, but also-often to the dismay of many political
pluralists who sided with labor in its battle against capital-the
business corporation.91 Cultural critics, in turn, found in James's
pluralism a response to the ideology of the melting pot, that is, the
notion that all cultures were destined to become merged into a
homogeneous mass, and that all cultural groups should thus seek to
divest themselves of traces of their native cultures. Instead, cultural
pluralists stressed the significant contributions of diverse ethnic and
racial groups to the western democratic tradition. In their writings,
ethnic, racial, and class differences became important sources of, not
obstacles to, individual freedom.
92
The analysis proposed by cultural and political pluralists
anticipated issues raised in our contemporary discussions of civil
society and our debates over the politics of identity, especially with
respect to indigenous peoples. Cultural pluralists sought legal
mechanisms that would accommodate the distinct heritages of diverse
cultural groups, while political pluralists strove to empower distinct
associations by recognizing their sovereignty, however limited. As a
midway between radical collectivism and conservative individualism,
cultural and political pluralists chose the group as the forum in which
individuals received meanings for their ideas and actions. 93 Cultural
pluralists emphasized the particular and group-derived identities of
individuals and urged the preservation of different cultural heritages.
Political pluralists advocated a functional concept of political
representation to protect the needs of diverse associations. Despite
their seemingly distinct focal points-involuntary versus voluntary
associations-cultural and political pluralists alike envisioned groups
as repositories of particular' ends that policymakers needed to
recognize. Whether espousing the idea of "cultural self-determination"
90. JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE, supra note 86, at 321-22.
91. See, e.g., THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF G.D.H.
COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989). But see W. Y. ELLIOTT, THE
PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN POLITICS: SYNDICALISM, FASCISM, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
(1928).
92. See, e.g., Horace M. Kallen, Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot (pts. 1 & 2), THE
NATION, Feb. 18, 1915, at 190-94 & Feb. 25, 1915, at 217-20 [hereinafter Kallen, Democracy
Versus the Melting-Pot], reprinted in HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLES 67 (1924)
[hereinafter KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES].
93. See Ernst, supra note 2, at 60.
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or promoting the idea of "self-government," advocates of both
ideologies pledged a strong commitment to group autonomy.
For most of the 1910s and 1920s, pluralistic visions of the state
were limited to critiques of existing policies. But the coming to power
of the New Deal administration offered an opportunity for many
pluralists to bring their theories to bear upon national policy.94 The
door of federal Indian law opened with the appointment of John
Collier, a cultural pluralist, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
95
Shortly after his appointment, Collier announced that the government
was obligated to reestablish Indian communities and to "reawaken in
the soul of the Indian not only pride in being an Indian, but also hope
for his future as an Indian ... to preserve the Indian's love of and ardor





The enactment of legislation that would promote tribal
sovereignty was delayed for various reasons, including the fact that
Collier had yet to solidify his passion into a comprehensive legal
program. Then, in the fall of 1933, a decision was made to bring in
"experts" "with little previous involvement with Indian affairs to take
the lead in preparing the legislative program." 97 Felix Cohen was one
of the two assistant solicitors appointed by Nathan R. Margold, the
new Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, to the task of bill
drafting; Cohen's task was to help draft the IRA.98
Shortly after his appointment, Cohen criticized federal Indian
policy, particularly the policy of allotment, as creating on Indian
reservations "a condition approximating legalized anarchy, controlled
in practice only by the unreviewable disciplinary powers of the Indian
Office." 99  To repair the damage, Cohen suggested that the new
94. See id. (explaining the impact of early twentieth-century theories of pluralism on
labor legislation).
95. Cf Everett Helmut Akam, Pluralism and the Search for Community: The Social
Thought of American Cultural Pluralists (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Rochester) (on file with University Microfilm International). For more information on the
appointment of Collier and others, see T.H. WATKINS, RIGHTEOUS PILGRIM: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF HAROLD L. ICKES, 1874-1952, at 325-33 (1990); and PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S
CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM, supra note 42, at 113-17.
96. Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier and the American Indian, 1920-1945, in ESSAYS ON
RADICALISM IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 63, 70 (Leon Borden Blair ed., 1972).
97. Rusco, supra note 11, at 192.
98. Id. at 177-92.
99. [Felix S. Cohen], Memorandum: The Problem of Law and Order on Indian
Reservations in Relation to the Wheeler-Howard Bill (ca. 1934), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box
1, Folder 11, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University
[hereinafter Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation to the Wheeler-
Howard Bill]. My attribution of this Memorandum to Cohen is based on its content and style
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administration should stop the pressing of "capitalist individualism" on
Indian tribes "through the allotment of tribal property to individual
Indians and through the inculcation of the capitalist psychology," and
instead should protect and encourage "a communal ceremony."' 100
Cohen believed that these ends should guide the drafting of the IRA.
As the following section demonstrates, Cohen's critique of
federal Indian policy and his understanding of the goals of the Indian
New Deal were informed by a particular interpretation of pluralism. I
suggest that when Cohen joined the Department of the Interior, he
envisioned a society composed of a variety of self-governing groups,
coordinated by a centralized government. I label this image "socialist
pluralism." In Cohen's opinion, Indian reservations were to become a
symbol of the feasibility of his socialist pluralist ideal. He hoped that
the establishment of socialist communities on Indian reservations
would be a first step toward the formation of similar communities
nationwide.
B. Reorganization and Socialist Pluralism
The eldest of the three children of Mary Ryshpan and Morris
Raphael Cohen (the renowned Jewish philosopher), Felix Cohen
graduated from City College of New York in 1926 and pursued
graduate studies both in the Department of Philosophy at Harvard
University (Ph.D., 1929) and at Columbia Law School (LL.B., 1931).
Following his graduation from law school, Cohen spent a year clerking
for Justice Bernard Sheintag of the Supreme Court of New York. He
then joined the law firm of Hays, Podell and Shulman in New York, a
plaintiffs firm that specialized in minority stockholders' claims. In
1933, when Nathan Margold, the newly appointed Solicitor of the
Department of the Interior, offered Cohen a year-long position as an
Assistant Solicitor in the Department, Cohen accepted and left private
practice. The planned year stretched to fourteen. In 1943, Cohen was
promoted to the position of Associate Solicitor. Upon his resignation
and on a note from Fred Daiker to Harry Edelstein (Aug, 13, 1937), Felix S. Cohen Papers,
Box 1, Folder 11, supra, which identifies Cohen as the author. See also Rusco, supra note 11,
at 200. For a description of federal Indian policy on the eve of the New Deal, see supra
section II.A.
100. Letter from Felix Cohen to Norman Thomas (Nov. 8, 1933), Joseph P. Lash Papers,
Box 50, Folder 9, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Of course, Cohen added, real estate interests
saw in "unrestricted Indian ownership of individual lands an opportunity to grab good land at
low prices or simply to shift local taxes." Id. He stressed, however, that "the officials in the
service, whether misguided or not, [had] an honest idealism that one [didn't] find in private
business or private law practice to really the same effect." Id.
MARGINS
from government service in 1947, Cohen received the Distinguished
Service Award. Six short years later he died at the age of forty-six.i0'
According to his widow, Lucy M. Kramer, Cohen was
"attracted to Indian law because he had a great feel for the land and the
return to the simple life." 102 Indeed, like many middle class men of his
generation who shared a nostalgic love for nature and the natural,103
Cohen held a stereotypical, sentimental view of the "Indian."
Informed by it, Cohen believed that Indian reservations held a promise
for a better national future, a future premised on group self-
government, centralized planning at the federal level, and protection of
individual rights. This combination of socialism and pluralism
underlay Cohen's socialist pluralist ideal.
As a relative noted after his death, Cohen was "a doctrinaire
socialist"; no one "could reason him out of it. He knew what was
right." 104 Cohen's Ph.D. dissertation advocated hedonism as the ethical
system befitting the political agenda of socialism. 0 5  At Colombia
Law School, he embraced the legal realist emphasis on the social and
political character of law.'0 6 If, as legal realists argued, law reflected
politics, particularly the hegemony of class, then, Cohen suggested,
progressive reform required the substitution of radical for conservative
politics, that is, socialism for capitalism.' °7 In the early 1930s, Cohen
published a series of essays in support of socialism.'08 Shortly after
joining the Department of the Interior, he wrote a letter to "Comrade"
Norman Thomas-"a statement of the position that one Socialist finds
himself in within the framework of a capitalist government." "I feel
that I owe you, whose judgment in these matters I most respect,"
101. See FELIX S. COHEN: A FIGHTER FOR JUSTICE, supra note 13; Symposium: Felix S.
Cohen, supra note 13.
102. Lucy Kramer-Cohen et al., Felix Cohen and the Adoption of the IRA, in INDIAN
SELF-RULE, supra note 9, at 70, 70.
103. See T.J. JACKSON LEARS, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE, 1880-1920, at 144-49 (1981).
104. David Ryshpan, Interview by Joseph Lash, ca. 1965, Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box 50,
Folder 9, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; see also correspondence between Felix Cohen and
Joseph Lash, Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box 51, Folder 4, supra (discussing European socialism,
municipal socialism, and affairs of the Socialist Party in America).
105. See FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1933) [hereinafter COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL
IDEALS].
106. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 169-92.
107. For an analysis of Cohen's legal realism, see TSUK, ENCOUNTERS WITH PLURALISM,
supra note 13 (manuscript at pt. II, on file with author).
108. See Felix S. Cohen, Politics and Economics, in SOCIALIST PLANNING AND A
SOCIALIST PROGRAM: A SYMPOSIUM 69 (Harry W. Laidler ed., 1932); Felix S. Cohen,
Socialism and the Myth of Legality, 4 AM. SOCIALIST Q. 3 (1935).
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Cohen concluded his letter, "a statement of my reasons for thinking
that I can serve the Socialist movement, for a while at least, in my
present status."'
' 0 9
Cohen's reasons were simple. He believed that in the
Department of the Interior, with colleagues who expressed "a pretty
steadfast desire to protect challenged Indian rights against various
forms of capitalist exploitation,"' 10 he could bring to fruition his
program for reform. "One expects enthusiasm in the [National
Recovery Administration] crowd, who expect they're ushering in the
millennium with golden trumpets," Cohen wrote to Joseph Lash, "but
to find it in a staid and stable department like the Interior is a
shock.""' "Even the lawyers around the place," he added in self-
reflection, "who might be expected to inject a shot of cynicism and




Cohen's program for reform was informed by theories of
political pluralism, particularly Harold Laski's, 1 3 and by the legal
realists' view of law as an apology for political (social and economic)
oppression. 1 4  Reflecting Cohen's concerns about the rise of big
corporations and the growing agitation of labor, his early works
analogized what Cohen viewed as the sovereign status of corporations
to the status of labor unions. He urged the distribution of sovereignty
to all associations, including labor unions, "trade unions, industrial
109. Letter from Felix Cohen to Norman Thomas (Nov. 8, 1933), supra note 100.
Thomas replied with approval, emphasizing (a) the importance of "real service"; (b) the
opportunity to train for administrative work, a training that could, in the future, help the
Socialist Party; and (c) Cohen's freedom in the Department of the Interior to implement his
policies. "[Y]ou will resign when your freedom in this respect is denied," Thomas concluded.
Letter from Norman Thomas to Felix Cohen (Nov. 14 1933), Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box 50,
Folder 9, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
110. Letter from Felix Cohen to Norman Thomas (Nov. 8, 1933), supra note 100. See
also Letter from Felix Cohen to Joseph Lash (Oct. 26, 1933), Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box 51,
Folder 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. Cohen wrote:
I'm amazed at the amount of idealism floating around the place. Even old
employers rally enthusiastically to the defense of the oppressed Indian.
And the law librarian (who probably dates from Taft or Wilson) took me
aside today and confidentially showed me Norman Thomas's latest article
in the World Tomorrow (I had asked for something much more prosaic).
He was very much excited about this article on ending war and also about
an editorial tribute to Hillquit on the opposite page. "These are the
pioneers," he said. "After all, it's the pioneers that count."
Id.
111. Letter from Felix Cohen to Joseph Lash, (Oct. 26, 1933), supra note 110.
112. Id. Other New Dealers seem to have shared this feeling. E.g., Rusco, supra note
11, at 183 (describing William Zimmerman's vivid picture of "zest and fun" combined with "a
sense of urgency" during the first months of the new administration).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
114. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 1.
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unions, consumer organizations, farm organizations, semi-
governmental corporations, and forms of associations that have not yet
been invented. ' 15 Sovereignty was conditioned, however, upon a
group's willingness to be democratically governed and, if possible, its
readiness to adopt an economic structure premised on communal
ownership of property. Cohen's early works, in short, envisioned self-
governing communities such as labor unions as the foundation of the
modern American state." 
6
Pluralists described a variety of principles according to which
collective entities participated in the body politic of the nation. Many
left the state devoid of any superior moral character or obliging force.
The state was a "society of societies," and individuals' allegiance to it
was conditioned upon their other-more immediate-allegiances to
associations, the latter being the primary source of action and
identification. 117  In 1937, Louis Jaffe summarized this view,
concluding that if groups were sovereign, they were also lawmaking
entities and the state lost its absolute power as an exclusive producer
of a singular system of national law. "18
Cohen rejected such conclusions. As a socialist, he feared that
without centralized planning, free competition between corporations
and labor unions would benefit the former at the expense of the latter.
He further predicted that the idea of a free market of groups would
substitute the sovereignty of the corporation for the sovereignty of the
state.11 9 Instead of reducing sovereignty to its parts, Cohen's approach
was premised on a strong commitment to governmental (socialist)
planning. He believed that national planning was required not only to
coordinate the plans of different self-governing associations, to
balance production and consumption, and to distribute wealth and
income, but also to protect fundamental individual rights. 12
0
115. Felix S. Cohen, What City College Will Contribute to the Development of the Law, 2
THE BARRISTER, 4, 8 (1938).
116. See id.; see also works cited supra note 108.
117. GREGOR MCLENNAN, PLURALISM 33 (1995).
118. Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1937).
119. See Felix S. Cohen, Address before the Columbia Law School Liberal Club (1939),
Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box 1, Folder 11, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library; see also Felix S.
Cohen, Government and the Social Contract: Ethical Evaluations in the Law, Address before
the Eastern Law Students Conference, New York University School of Law (Mar. 7, 1936), in
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 350, 362.
120. In the mid 1930s, together with a few friends, Cohen composed a Proposed
Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth ofAmerica. It promoted decentralized control of
the means of production by democratically governed groups coordinated through
governmental planning. It also protected individual rights. Felix S. Cohen et al., Proposed
Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of America, Joseph P. Lash Papers, Franklin D.
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When he joined the New Deal, Cohen viewed Indian
reservations as fertile fields for the cultivation of his ideal of socialist
pluralism. The traditional tribal holding of lands suggested to him that
the Indian way of life was more akin to socialism than was the
contemporaneous American way of life. Cohen's critique of
assimilation did not stem from concerns about the effects of forced
assimilation on tribal culture. Rather, Cohen was troubled by the
disintegration of the economic structure of Indian tribes and the
imposition of capitalist individualism on Indian reservations. In short,
in Cohen's opinion, assimilation was an economic rather than a
cultural phenomenon. He viewed Indian tribes as political groups, not
ethnic or cultural ones; indeed, they were political groups whose
economic structure (particularly their structure of property ownership)
Cohen hoped to appropriate for other political groups and for society
in general. Accordingly, for a while after he had joined the Department
of the Interior to help draft the IRA, Cohen used to comment that they
were "making 'Reds' of the Indians."'
12 1
Arguably, the IRA intended to stop allotment and assimilation
and to delegate to Indian tribes more authority over their economic,
social, and political affairs. 122  For example, Cohen suggested that
"through the mechanism of municipal and quasi-municipal charters
issued by the Secretary of the Interior to Indian tribes and ratified by
the Indians concerned," Indians would establish their self-
government.123  He believed that the incorporation of Indian tribes
would prevent future loss of Indian lands and would allow the
repurchase of reservation lands already lost to non-Indians. Cohen
further maintained that the government should provide Indians with
the credit facilities they needed to develop their own properties and
should encourage communal holding of lands and other resources that
could not be efficiently used by individuals.' 24 Ultimately, the various
political and economic powers which were in 1934 invested in the
Department of the Interior were to be transferred to their true
owners-to Indian tribes. 125 Through the establishment of "definite
community ordinances" and community courts, as well as a special
Roosevelt Library [hereinafter Cohen et al., Proposed Constitution for the Socialist
Commonwealth ofAmerica].
121. Ambrose Doskow, Interview by Joseph Lash, ca. 1965, Joseph P. Lash Papers, Box
51, Folder 11, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
122. See supra section II.B.
123. Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation to the Wheeler-
Howard Bill, supra note 99.




Federal Court of Indian Affairs, Cohen also expected an important
shift toward legal stability and political advancement. 26 When all that
was secured, he predicted, the powers of the BIA to govern tribal
affairs could be entirely abolished.
127
Yet, in Cohen's view, the goals of the IRA reached beyond the
establishment of tribal governments. Cohen hoped that the Act would
promote his ideal of socialist pluralism. He did not merely wish to
"make 'Reds' of the Indians" 128; Cohen believed that Indians were
socialists. "The Indian," he wrote-disclosing his biased position-
was "too deficient in the white man's business equipment, the white
man's love of work, and the white man's selfishness to maintain his
economic independence when he is turned loose, as an individual, to
face the mighty forces of the modern economic world. 1 2
9
Accordingly, solutions that did not attend to the economic and political
interests of Indian tribes were oppressive. "We will not add to the
Indian's freedom by accepting the shallow arguments of those who
insist that the Indian will be free when he is given his own individual
property, [and] permitted to live under state laws and enjoy freedom of
contract," Cohen proclaimed. 130  Instead, he wanted the IRA to
acknowledge the socialist temperament of Indian tribes and to correct
the damage caused by earlier attempts to eradicate it. According to
Cohen, in short, the IRA was meant to create genuine socialist
communities on Indian reservations 31 and to provide a model that
other groups could adopt.
Lest I am misunderstood, Cohen genuinely advocated Indian
self-government. Furthermore, he maintained that the provisions of
126. Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation to the Wheeler-
Howard Bill, supra note 99; see also Rusco, supra note 11, at 197-201.
127. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 36. The implications were clear to Cohen.
As he noted:
The Indian Bureau should have no greater powers of government than the
Weather Bureau. So far as I know, the Weather Bureau has never
attempted to prevent the savage custom of clouds or to impose a model
code of conduct upon the winds. I am sure the Indian Bureau could have
contributed more to the happiness of its wards and to the richness of its
American service if it had emulated the Weather Bureau's illustrious
example and restricted its functions to the fields of research and public
service.
Id.
128. Ambrose Doskow, Interview by Joseph Lash, supra note 121.
129. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 36.
130. Id.; see also Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation to the
Wheeler-Howard Bill, supra note 99.
131. Letter from Felix Cohen to Joseph Lash, (May 27, 1934), Joseph P. Lash Papers,
Box 51, Folder 4, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
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the IRA should not be imposed on Indian tribes; he urged the tailoring
of charters to the needs of each Indian community; and he stressed the
importance of consultation with Indians during the legislative
processes.132 Cohen's proposed community courts indeed intended to
allow tribes to create their own laws.'
33
Cohen wanted to reestablish tribal governments. Yet, knowing
little about Indian cultures and customs, he interpreted Indian tribes'
interests through his frames of reference. For one thing, when Cohen
joined the Department of the Interior, he believed that the policy of
allotment had destroyed tribal governments, turning Indian
reservations in the eyes of the law (without an authority to enforce
laws) into "almost a no-man's land."' 134  The establishment of
132. Rusco, supra note 11, at 211. Indeed, Cohen noted that "[tihe feeling of the Indians
towards white man's law [was] often very much like the attitude we should [have taken] if
[our] country were to come under the domination of some foreign nation of alien race, and our
conduct subjected to the laws and regulations of a far-off sovereign and to a strange judicial
procedure." Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation to the
Wheeler-Howard Bill, supra note 99; see also Draft of address by Margold, supra note 36.
Cohen wrote:
The problem of securing a measure of freedom for the Indians of this
country calls for more than the abolition of obsolete laws, it calls for more
than the abolition of undemocratic methods of government. It calls for the
active, constructive, cooperation of the Government with the Indians in
building a form of organization through which the Individual Indian can
protect and conserve his rights. Without such organization the Indian can
enjoy freedom only as the favor of a benevolent administration.
Id. Cohen recruited his wife Lucy M. Kramer as an unpaid volunteer to "keep track of how
various Indian tribes were reacting to the specific tentative provisions of the Wheeler-Howard
bill." Kramer-Cohen et al., supra note 102, at 71.
133. Rusco, supra note 11, at 197-201.
134. Draft of Address by Margold, supra note 36; see also Memorandum: Law and Order
on Indian Reservations in Relation to the Wheeler-Howard Bill, supra note 99. As Cohen
explained, according to the holding in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)-the case
that recognized Indian tribes as separate nations-the states had no constitutional power to
regulate the conduct of tribal Indians or the conduct of their own citizens toward such Indians
where the acts in question occurred in Indian country, that is, restricted individual lands as
well as unallotted tribal lands. Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in
Relation to the Wheeler-Howard Bill, supra note 99. While some historians have recently
argued that the policy of allotment did not destroy tribal governments on a wholesale basis, the
New Dealers in general seem to have believed that the policy of allotment had hastened the
disintegration of tribal governments and left no machinery of justice on the reservations. Cf
Rusco, supra note 11, at 56-61. Though several criminal laws applied to these territories,
Cohen suggested that they were, at most, sporadic and irregular. An Indian reservation, Cohen
noted, was still in 1933-"as it had been a century earlier, a happy hunting ground for
criminals, provided only [that] they refrained from seditious activities." Draft of Address by
Margold, supra note 36. Furthermore, as Cohen explained, neither Indians nor non-Indians
were entitled to ordinary constitutional civil liberties while on Indian reservations. Federal
laws authorized the Commissioner of Indian affairs to summarily remove from any
reservation, "with such force as might be necessary," any person whose presence within the
limits of the reservation the Commissioner viewed as "detrimental to the peace and welfare of
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American-style governments, modeled after municipal and housing
corporations and subject to the supervision of the Department, was
thus the only alternative to assimilation. 135  Furthermore, Cohen's
proposals outlined ways to persuade, even force, Indians who wished
to remain owners of individual property to turn over to their
communities the lands they owned. 36 Cohen also believed that "if
every member of the community [was] to be granted some opportunity
to wrest a livelihood from the limited resources of the community,"
unequal distribution of rights to land had to be eliminated.'37 Finally,
while Cohen recognized the importance of receiving information from
reservations with respect to the IRA, he maintained that consulting the
Indians was vital "to awaken sympathetic understanding among those
most directly concerned with this policy."' 138  Critical of earlier
attempts to impose capitalist individualism on Indian reservations, 139
Cohen initially failed to recognize that the structure he preferred (that
is, socialist pluralism) was a cultural product, too, and not necessarily
suitable for the customs and traditions of Indian tribes. Intellectually
committed to pluralism, Cohen, nonetheless, hoped to create a single
economic, if not also political, structure on Indian reservations.
Cohen's colleagues shared his assumptions. Whether or not
they drew on theories of pluralism, the New Dealers sought to protect
the autonomy of Indian tribes without segregating them from
American society. Their solution was thus a problematic mixture: they
relied on American structures of government to protect Indian
traditions and customs, and they assumed that uniform political and
economic structures-self-government and communal holding of
lands-would promote Indians' interests. While the New Dealers
recognized particular differences, they viewed the general framework
the Indians." Id.; see also Memorandum: Law and Order on Indian Reservations in Relation
to the Wheeler-Howard Bill, supra note 99.
135. See Bibliography for use in drafting Tribal Constitutions, Felix S. Cohen Papers,
Box 6, Folder 77, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
136. Rusco, supra note 11, at 197-98.
137. Id. at 198. While Cohen realized that stating such an objective was politically
inadvisable, he also thought it was legally unnecessary, because Indian communities would
have to arrive at such a policy by "reasoning and bargaining, no matter what the statute
provides." Id.
138. Id. at 211 (quoting Cohen in a memorandum to John Collier).
139. For Cohen's view of attempts to impose policies on Indian reservations, see, for
example, Draft of Letter from Felix Cohen to Thomas Dignan, Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 7,
Folder 95, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University. Cohen
wrote: "The matter of working out a charter of self-government is something which the
Indians must do themselves, if the bill is passed, with the aid of private attorneys in whom
they have confidence, and of officials of the Interior Department." Id.
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in universal, absolute terms. Neither the liberals, nor the socialists
among them fully realized the situated nature of their frames of
reference.
40
Situating the IRA within the broader story of American legal
pluralism underscores the interplay between philosophy and law-
theory and practice. Cohen's attempt to bring theories of pluralism to
bear upon national policy resembled other endeavors to devise a
pluralistic polity undertaken during the early twentieth century.
Spurred by a new American philosophy and an abundance of good
intentions, many such attempts at creating a pluralistic state ended up
harming those they were intended to help or, at most, were symbolic in
their success. As already noted, the IRA failed to accomplish the goals
it was set to achieve. Yet, as the following sections show, legal
practice gradually reshaped theory.
C. Interlude: Systematic Pluralism
141
Socialist pluralism was one model for devising a pluralistic
polity. It assumed that federal law could accommodate, with one
structure, the interests of a variety of groups. Hence, it was not
necessarily adaptable to the diverse tribal traditions. Inspired by
socialist pluralism, the IRA attempted to protect the political and
economic interests of Indian tribes without taking full cognizance of
the cultural and social systems in which these interests were formed.
Indeed, one of the major drawbacks of the IRA was the New Dealers'
na'ivet with respect to Indian cultures, customs, and laws. Cohen, for
140. Cf James P. Boggs, Nepa in the Domain of Federal Indian Policy: Social
Knowledge and the Negotiation of Meaning, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 31(1991). Boggs
notes:
[M]ost scholars regard the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 as
inaugurating a distinctly new policy-promoting the reconstitution of
tribal governments-in reaction to the excesses of the allotment period.
One may argue, however, that the IRA merely signaled a shift from the
individualist mode of assimilation that drove allotment to a-corporatist
mode that accorded with the emergence of the corporation in everyday
life. The IRA undoubtedly was a reaction to the devastation of allotment.
Nevertheless, it reflected assimilation in a different guise rather than a
new-found respect for Native American culture.
Id. at 59.
141. The label "systematic pluralism" is meant to allude to an article in which, as I show,
Cohen articulated this particular interpretation of pluralism-an intermediate between his
models of socialist and comparative pluralism. See Felix S. Cohen, The Relativity of
Philosophical Systems and the Method of Systematic Relativism, 36 J. PHIL. 57 (1939)




example, came to the New Deal believing that racial and ethnic
tensions would disappear once class conflict was resolved. His daily
encounters with Indian tribes-particularly, I suspect, his study of
tribal constitutions in preparation for writing new ones 142-taught him
otherwise.
As this section shows, Cohen's experience in administering the
IRA made him more attentive to cultural interests and gradually led
him to identify not only a multiplicity of group interests within one
system, but also a multiplicity of value systems. This was the premise
of Cohen's ideal of systematic pluralism, which he articulated in the
late 1930s.
As early as 1935, Cohen suggested that American law
represented not only the force of the state utilized by a dominant
capitalist class, but also the force of the state utilized for the hegemony
of culture. 143  Given the multiplicity of social (economic, political,
cultural) interests, he wrote, the multiple meanings of legal concepts
were tools in the hands of powerful lawmaking agencies; they gave a
concept one meaning when applied to one interest group, and another
when applied to a different group. 144 Recognizing with pluralists the
incompleteness of human knowledge, 45 Cohen thus urged the
understanding of legal reality, and hence the definition of legal rules,
as reflecting a variety of interdependent particular and collective
interests. 146
Cohen's growing attentiveness to the complexity of legal
reality as reflecting a variety of social, cultural, economic, and
political interests helped to transform his understanding of pluralism.
Gradually, he began to suggest that diverse interests were not
contained within one value (or legal) system. Rather, these interests
were spread over different systems. For example, concepts like
communal holding of property meant one thing to socialists and
142. See Felix S. Cohen, Indian Self-Government, 5 AM. INDIAN 3 (1949) [hereinafter
Cohen, Indian Self-Government], reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 305,
306-07. See also Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 7, Folder 100, Yale Collection of Western
Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
143. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense], reprinted in THE
LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 33.
144. Id.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
146. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 143; Felix S. Cohen, The
Problems of a Functional Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REV. 5 (1937), reprinted in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 77. For an examination of the importance of Transcendental
Nonsense to the history both of pluralism and of legal realism, see TSUK, ENCOUNTERS WITH
PLURALISM, supra note 13 (manuscript at pt. II, on file with author).
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another to Indians. The success of the IRA thus depended not only on
the establishment of stable economic and political structures on Indian
reservations; it further required an understanding of the cultural and
emotional meaning that Indian tribes attributed to tribal sovereignty.
"It is extremely likely that organized Indian tribes will continue to
exist," Cohen wrote in 1939, "as long as American democracy exists
and as long as the American people are unwilling to use the army to
carry out Indian policies."'147 More important, organized tribes would
exist "provided that the Indians themselves feel that tribal
governments satisfy important human wants. 148 The life expectancy
of various tribal constitutions could thus be figured, Cohen concluded,
by assigning numbers to a variety of factors:
[T]he extent to which the organized tribe ministers to
the common economic needs of the people, the degree
in which the organized tribe satisfies recreational and
cultural wants, the extent and efficiency of municipal
services which the tribe renders, the general social
solidarity of the community, and the vigor with which
the tribal government expresses the dissatisfactions of
the people and organizes the wishes of the people along
rational lines.
149
A (tribal) constitution became, in short, "the formal structure
of a reality that exists in human hearts."'150  As Cohen proclaimed,
"[a]n Indian constitution will exist as long as there remains in human
hearts a community of interdependence, of common interests,
aspirations, hopes, and fears, in realms of art and politics, work and
play."'151 Only Indian tribes-not the administration-could establish
147. Felix S. Cohen, How Long Will Indian Constitutions Last?, 6 INDIANS AT WORK
(Dep't of Interior) 40 (1939), reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 222, 223-
24.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 228.
150. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
151. Id. Almost four decades later, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan would
echo Cohen. In an introduction to a collection of essays on Ethnicity: Theory and Experience,
they wrote that "the cultural content of each ethnic group in the United States seems to have
become very similar to that of others, but the emotional significance of attachments to the
ethnic group seems to persist." Nathan Glazer & Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Introduction to
ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 8 (1975) (quoted in WERNER SOLLORS, BEYOND
ETHNICITY: CONSENT AND DESCENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 35 (1986)). Sollors similarly
commented that American ethnicity "is a matter not of content but of the importance that
individuals ascribe to it." SOLLORS, supra, at 35.
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stable tribal governments, and only when they did, could there be a
pluralistic polity.
Here is where Cohen's analysis during the late 1930s departed
from his model for the IRA. Like earlier discussions of political
pluralism,152 socialist pluralism was premised on a categorical
description of conflict as a struggle over limited economic resources:
employers against employees, corporations against labor unions,
producers against consumers, and Indians against non-Indians. The
solution was universal and "scientific": redistribution. It seldom
meant more than a repositioning of two sides to a conflict. It neglected
to notice that particular interests were embedded in distinct legal and
political systems. In the late 1930s, having realized the multiplicity of
cultures, groups, and forms of knowledge, Cohen came to find
unfeasible the assumption that one could provide a universal solution
for diverse conflicts. Although grounded in theories of pluralism, such
a solution, Cohen suggested, forced assimilation.
How, then, should the modem American state accommodate
the plurality of interests that characterized society? By the late 1930s,
Cohen articulated an ideal of systematic pluralism, or what he labeled
systematic relativism, as a model for realizing diverse interests.
Informed by earlier theories of cultural lluralism, particularly Horace
Kallen's orchestral vision of America, systemic relativism was, in
Cohen's view, "a principle of logical tolerance."' 154
Building on his 1935 critique of abstract concepts as tools of
cultural and political oppression,' 5 Cohen's principle of systematic
relativism recognized that the meaning of concepts depended upon
systems of reference that were external to them, and that many such
systems were possible. Legal change thus required not only the
understanding of legal reality as a variety of interrelated particular and
collective interests, but also the reconstitution of different systems as
broader and more inclusive. If different philosophical systems could
be increased in scope to maintain common content, Cohen wrote, then,
the distinction between the meanings given to abstract concepts within
each of them was one of degree-of emotions and attitudes-not of
kind. Such, Cohen believed, was also the difference between "red"
and "white" America. 15
6
152. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
153. See supra text accompanying note 92.
154. Cohen, Systematic Relativism, supra note 141, at 98.
155. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 143.
156. See Cohen, Systematic Relativism, supra note 141. Cohen concluded the article by
noting:
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Systematic pluralism was supported by a particular theory of
ethics, which Cohen articulated in the mid-1930s. Throughout his life,
Cohen rejected moral positivism and instead emphasized the
interdependence of legal science and ethical criticism. Law, he
believed, should be grounded in a normative system. 157 Cohen's early
writings sought to anchor legal criticism in hedonism. 158 As he turned
away from socialist pluralism, his ethical ideal changed, too. Instead
of hedonism (a rather monistic theory), Cohen adopted a "socialized
morality"-an ethical theory that sought to integrate "the life of
society as traditional morality has integrated the lives of
individuals."'
159
The central point of Cohen's socialized morality was a
rejection of traditional morality. Specifically, Cohen wished to rebut
the metaphysical dogma that traditional morality presupposed, that is,
"the dogma that the individual is an ultimate unity and society an
ultimate plurality."' 60  According to Cohen, such a dogma helped to
prevent the development of a pluralistic state by describing "all the
adjustments, balances, and compromises which are the substance of
morality" as taking place "within an individual life."'' Social
balance, particularly the redistribution of wealth, was thus preordained
to be unjust, though a similar balance within a single life-that is, "the
sacrifice of today's pleasure for tomorrow's"--was commendable.1
62
The method of systemic relativism, applied in the jungles of politics,
frequently demonstrates that what appear to be bitter differences of
opinion on practical matters are actually differences of terminology or
perspective. Rational argument in this situation becomes possible only
when, through some emotional shift, one party comes to accept the
postulates and definitions of his adversary and to talk in the same system,
or when a third party (i.e., a "politician" or "statesman") is found who can
talk to each of the disputants in his own system and thus offer each a
practical solution which is what he wanted all along and was convinced
his adversary did not want, but which, as a matter of fact, his adversary
does not object to if only it is phrased in the proper way.
Id. at 110.
157. For Cohen's rejection of the dichotomy between descriptive and normative social
science, see COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS, supra note 105; Felix .S. Cohen,
Modern Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOK. L. REv. 33 (1934), reprinted in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 17; and Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 143.
158. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS, supra note 105; see also supra
section III.B.
159. Felix S. Cohen, The Socialization of Morality, in AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY TODAY
AND ToMoRRow 83 (Horace M. Kallen & Sidney Hook eds., 1935), reprinted in THE LEGAL
CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 337, 348.




Cohen's alternative was a socialized morality. Its metaphysical
dogma revealed "something of the unity of the individual in society
itself and something of the plurality of society in the individual
life."' 6 3  By admitting-that adjustment and integration of diverse
interests were possible (according to individualized morality, such was
indeed the essence of individual life), socialized morality made the
normative endorsement of pluralism less threatening to traditional
understandings of society. "The possibility of a social integration of
conflicting interests is substantiated," Cohen proclaimed, "by the
integration of conflicting interests in an individual life."' 1
64
Drawing on the ethical ideal of socialized morality, Cohen
articulated his ideal of systematic pluralism to advocate policies that
would encourage the flourishing of diverse social ideas, beliefs, and
values. Cohen wanted law to promote solutions that could sustain the
individual as a modem social being in a pluralistic society. Every law,
Cohen thus argued, should be examined in light of its effects on the
enterprise of social integration. "Today, more than ever before,"
Cohen would reiterate in the midst of the Second World War, "we
need to study the legal relations that have served to bind together in
common cause and common effort peoples of different races, different
creeds, different social structures, and different ways of life."'
165
While Cohen's ideal of socialist pluralism was rooted in a
commitment to the mediation of conflicting interests within one legal
system, his model of systematic pluralism was an attempt to reconcile
conflicts between diverse value systems by expanding any given
system to encompass the values and assumptions of other systems. It
imagined law as capable of incorporating the variety of value systems
that characterized American society. It meant to protect the rights of
Indians to bring their different values into the American polity.
According to Cohen, the fulfillment of his ideal of systematic
pluralism required a commitment to group rights.
163. Id. at 347-48.
164. Id. at 348. As in his advocacy of pluralism, in his discussion of a socialized
morality, Cohen followed in the tradition of William James. See, for example, Hilary
Putnam's summary of James's views in Essays in Radical Empiricism:
[T]he self isn't a unity and the world isn't a unity, and so Kant had the
wrong problem. The problem shouldn't be to show that the unity of the
world is correlative with the unity of the self, but to show that the disunity
of the world is correlative with the disunity of the self.
HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE 233-34 (James Conant ed., 1990) (discussing
WILLIAM JAMES, ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM (1912)).
165. Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States,
31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942) [hereinafter Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights], reprinted in
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 230, 231.
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Cohen sought not only to acknowledge the existence of
different cultures, but also to articulate a comprehensive legal doctrine
that would protect them. A group right to have its cultural, political,
and social values accommodated by law was Cohen's legal ideal. His
writings during the 1940s suggested that an individualistic conception
of rights could not attend to the multiplicity of competing cultural,
social, economic, and political systems that characterized American
society. Social integration, according to Cohen, required law to
recognize the collective rights of diverse groups. 166  By way of
introduction to the Handbook of Federal Indian Law, which was
published in 1941, Cohen suggested that the legal endorsement of
collective rights reflected "a set of beliefs that [formed] the intellectual
equipment of a generation" 167:
[A] belief that our treatment of the Indian in the past is
not something of which a democracy can be proud, a
belief that the protection of minority rights and the
substitution of reason and agreement for force and
dictation represent a contribution to civilization, a belief
that confusion and ignorance in fields of law are allies
of despotism, a belief that it is the duty of the
Government to aid oppressed groups in the
understanding and appreciation of their legal rights, a
belief that understanding of the law, in Indian fields as
elsewhere, requires more than textual exegesis, requires
appreciation of history and understanding of economic,
political, social, and moral problems. These beliefs
represent ... the American mind in our generation as it
166. An individualistic conception of rights rests on the assumption that every individual
is a unique being with concrete needs, but that what constitutes one's moral dignity is not what
differentiates him or her from the other but what they, as rational beings, have in common. A
collective conception of rights, in turn, rests on the assumption that what constitutes one's
moral dignity is what differentiates him or her, as a member of a particular group, from others;
hence, the need to accommodate the unique interests of different groups. My interpretation of
Cohen's approach draws upon contemporary political theory. See Seyla Benhabib, The
Generalized and The Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist
Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 77, 86-91 (Seyla Benhabib &
Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987). For Cohen's approach, see Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the
Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REv. 145 (1940) [hereinafter Cohen, Indian Rights]; Cohen, The
Spanish Origin of Indian Rights, supra note 165; Felix S. Cohen, Colonialism: A Realistic
Approach, 55 ETHICS 167 (1945) [hereinafter Cohen, Colonialism: A Realistic Approach],
reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 364; and Cohen, Indian Self-
Government, supra note 142.
167. Felix S. Cohen, Author's Acknowledgments, in HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
supra note 16, at xviii [hereinafter Cohen, Author's Acknowledgments].
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impinges upon one tiny segment of the many problems
which modem democracy faces.'
68
Cohen's systematic pluralism was an attempt to articulate a
universal ideal (a common cause) that would include all particular
systems of reference. It accepted cultural pluralism, but rejected
separatism, that is, the idea that different cultures were detached from
each other. It opposed the forced assimilation of all cultural systems
into one, but envisioned all systems becoming one, and it viewed the
sovereign state as the driving force behind social integration. While
Cohen continued to embrace the rights of groups to have their different
values and needs accommodated by law, by the mid-1940s, as he was
working to resolve Indian land claims against the federal government,
his understanding of pluralism changed. Cohen continued to
emphasize the plurality of value systems; yet, instead of assigning to
the state the role of integrating different systems into a singular whole,
his analysis focused on the ability of the state to encourage
communication, dialogue, and translation between and among distinct
systems. As the following section elaborates, such were the premises
of his ideal of comparative pluralism.
D. Indian Claims and Comparative Pluralism
Like other 1930s attempts to devise a pluralistic polity,
Cohen's models of socialist and systematic pluralism relied on the
ability of humanistic experts-dedicated to democracy and the
decentralization of bureaucratic power-to lead the transformation
toward a pluralistic modem society. Early twentieth-century
intellectuals, more generally, believed that experts could arrive at
objective solutions to a wide range of social problems.' 69
In the mid-1940s, however, the intellectual faith in the ability
of experts to develop a pluralistic society declined. 170 Each expert
division in the Department of the Interior-that is, Education,
Forestry, Credit, and Law and Order-Cohen would write in 1949,
was in favor of self-government in general, but opposed to it in the
field over which the division itself had jurisdiction. Experts, he
explained, were reluctant to give up control over matters with which
they were concerned, especially when they disagreed with tribal
168. Id.
169. See Akam, supra note 95.
170. See HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 213-46.
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decisions. To protect against the possibility that such tribal decisions
would become law on the reservations, these experts imposed limits on
self-government. 171
As his disillusion with experts grew, the focus of Cohen's
analysis turned to volition and agency. The strength of American
democracy, Cohen wrote in the mid-1940s, was in the recognition that
government was not "a matter of wisdom, technique, or efficiency,"
but "a matter of right," a right which depended upon diverse human
purposes. 172 Government, in short, was "a matter chiefly of human
purpose" and each person was "a more faithful champion of his own
purposes than any expert."' 173  Though, as Cohen also noted,
governmental power often "[created] in its holders aspirations that
[conflicted] with those of the rest of society." 174
Instead of entrusting the development of a pluralistic polity to
experts, Cohen's writings in the mid-1940s emphasized the ability of
individuals and groups to actualize their destiny. "The most important
task" of his generation, Cohen wrote in 1945, was "that of finding
patterns by which men who differ in race, religion, and economic
outlook may live in peace and contribute to each other's prosperity."
175
Yet, while in the early 1940s, Cohen envisioned the sovereign state as
the force behind social integration, 176 in 1949 he would suggest that it
was not "the business of the Indian Bureau or of any other federal
agency to integrate Indians or Jews or Catholics or Negroes or Holy
Rollers or Jehovah's Witnesses into the rest of the population as a
solution for the Indian, Jewish, Negro, or Catholic problem, or any
other problem."' 177  It was, nonetheless, the duty of the federal
government "to respect the right of any group to be different so long as
it [did] not violate the criminal law."' 8
Seemingly subtle, the shift in Cohen's rhetoric-from social
integration to the promulgation of a group right to be different-is
important. As he described them in his writings during the early
171. Cohen, Indian Self-Government, supra note 142, at 309.
172. Cohen, Colonialism: A Realistic Approach, supra note 166, at 369.
173. Cohen, Indian Self-Government, supra note 142, at 313. -
174. Cohen, Colonialism: A Realistic Approach, supra note 166, at 369.
175. Id. at 364.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68. In particular, see Cohen's
acknowledgment that among the beliefs that supported the Handbook of Federal Indian Law
was "a belief that it is the duty of the Government to aid oppressed groups in the
understanding and appreciation of their legal rights." Cohen, Author's Acknowledgments,
supra note 167, at xviii.




1940s,-groups had little active role in the act of social integration. The
premise, which many pluralists shared, that identity was socially (if
not biologically) determined, often implied that individuals and groups
were social constructs, stripped of any notion of volition or human
agency, whose interests were protected by the pluralistic state.
Instead, Cohen's writings in the mid-1940s envisioned individuals and
groups as active agents, shaping their own destiny and the destiny of
others. This was also the premise of his ideal of comparative
pluralism.
Cohen's ideal of comparative pluralism envisioned individuals
and groups actively engaged (with others) in dialogue and translation.
It was rooted in the realization that understanding propositions "in the
context of [their] own field" would allow individuals to "translate
[every] proposition into language that will convey the same
informational content in any other value field [they] understand."' 7 9
This, Cohen would explain in the early 1950s, would allow individuals
not only "to uncover the inarticulate value premises" of themselves
and of others, but also "to understand the similarities and
dissimilarities that exist between any two value perspectives," and thus
to become more tolerant of "cultural diversities."' 8 Though Cohen
fully articulated his ideal of comparative pluralism only in the late
1940s, its seeds were planted in his work on the ICCA.
181
The Indian Claims Commission was created by the ICCA to
hear, determine, and bring an end to tribal land claims against the
federal government. 182  Cohen hoped that by waiving sovereign
immunity and allowing Indian tribes to sue the federal government, the
Indian Claims Commission would recognize Indian tribes' voices. As
the proof of title would often require the testimony of Indians and their
experts, rather than authorities external to the tribes, Cohen hoped that
the Commission would provide a forum for Indian tribes and
individual Indians to tell their side of American history. According to
179. Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238 (1950), reprinted
in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 121, 151.
180. Felix S. Cohen, The Reconstruction of Hidden Value Judgments: Word Choices as
Value Indicators, in SYMBOLS AND VALUES: AN INITIAL STUDY 549, 561 (Lyman Bryson et al.
eds., 1954). See also Felix S. Cohen, The Vocabulary of Prejudice, 19 FELLOWSHIP 5 (1953),
reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 429, 435.
181. On the ICCA, see supra section II.C.
182. The initial draft of the ICCA was largely Cohen's product. After it was introduced
before the House Indian Affairs Committee, it was revised to incorporate the ideas of Ernest
Wilkinson, who worked with Cohen, and to work out a series of amendments that members of
the House and Senate Indian Affairs Committees suggested. See LIEDER & PAGE, supra note
73, at 62-68.
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Cohen, the Commission was thus to operate not "on a purely legal
level"; it was "to operate as an administrative agency empowered to
reach a just solution within broad limits established by law." 183
Furthermore, in Cohen's opinion, to claim damages, Indians needed
only to prove their aboriginal title; they did not need to show a title
recognized by the federal government. 184  The Commission, Cohen
assumed, would address "all Indian claims, legal, equitable and
moral."'185  If the IRA set out to refute the antiquated policy of
assimilation, the Indian Claims Commission, Cohen believed, would
shape the future by telling a different narrative; it would give Indian
tribes a forum to voice their versions of American history.
By creating a forum for Indian tribes to tell their side of
American history, Cohen also believed that the Indian Claims
Commission would encourage dialogue. In his view, its proceedings
were meant to become exercises in hearing and learning from the
testimony of the other. By investigating "the entire field of Indian
claims, even for those tribes which may be too poor to hire their own
lawyers," Cohen hoped that the Commission would "conclude once
and for all this chapter of our national history,"'186  while
simultaneously calling attention to it. The legal remedy was meant to
bring closure. Yet, it was also intended to memorialize a different
183. Felix S. Cohen, Indian Claims, 2 Am. INDIAN 3 (1945) [hereinafter Cohen, Indian
Claims], reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 264, 272. Ironically, the
establishment of an administrative commission also indicated the continuing impact of the
trust in experts.
184. E.g., id. at 266-68. On November 25, 1946 Chief Justice Vinson announced that to
recover compensation for original title, Indian tribes needed only to identify themselves as
entitled to sue, prove their original Indian title to designated lands, and demonstrate that their
interest in such lands was taken without their consent and without compensation. The Court
announced that tribes did not need to show that the original Indian title had ever been formally
recognized by the United States. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40
(1946). Though, in Cohen's opinion, the establishment in the preceding summer of the Indian
Claims Commission foreshadowed the decision, its importance did not escape him. As he
wrote to Mary-K Morris Bell, who worked with him on the Handbook of Federal Indian Law:
You will be happy to learn ... that the Supreme Court this week handed
down a most important decision on Indian claims-I am having a copy
sent to you under separate cover-which relies very considerably on a
portion of the Handbook that you wrote. It must be very gratifying to you,
as it is to me, that the Supreme Court does not agree with some of our
critics who made the historical portions of the Handbook an object of
particular scorn. It is really a matter of poetic justice that the Department
of Justice should have lost an important case on this issue.
Letter from Felix S. Cohen to Mary-K Morris Bell (Nov. 29, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers,
Box 71, Folder 1132, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale
University.
185. Cohen, Indian Claims, supra note 183, at 272.
186. Id.
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historical narrative. At least in the eyes of its drafter, the ICCA was a
genuine attempt to use law as a tool of reconciliation and
commemoration. Cohen hoped that the Commission would settle
historical acts of political and cultural violence between particular
groups while reconstructing new memories upon which they would
build a pluralistic state in the present.' 87
Thus described, Cohen's hopes for the ICCA, as his vision for
the IRA, seem both ambitious and naive. That the interests of Indian
tribes were ultimately impaired supports such charges. The tensions
that were reflected in the Indian New Deal-between theory and
practice, between visions of the pluralistic state and the outcomes of
attempts to devise it-seem to be a recurring motif in the history of
legal pluralism. As part IV suggests, these tensions are complex and
perhaps impossible to resolve, at least in part, because they are
personal. Cohen's interpretations of pluralism, for example, were
mediated through his own experience as a Jewish American. As I
show, federal Indian policy during the New Deal did not only record
and help to shape particular images of the pluralistic state; it also
reflected and helped to reconstruct different conceptions of identity.
IV. IDENTITY
A. Socialism and Assimilation
In 1948, upon his resignation from government service, Cohen
admitted that he had no practical experience with Indian issues before
he joined the Department of the Interior to help draft the IRA. 88
Though an admirer of the wilderness who, like young men of his
generation, loved hiking and canoeing, he was a New Yorker, "from a
city where there were no reclamation, public land, Indian or territorial
problems,-problems of which [he] had never heard until [he] came to
Washington. ' 89 I am "only a lawyer," Cohen wrote to anthropologist
187. Ironically, as Vine Deloria, Jr. has demonstrated, in practice, government attorneys
(among them some of the drafters of the ICCA) transferred all the procedures and theories of
the Court of Claims to the Commission, hence transforming it into a court and eliminating the
flexibility that Cohen hoped to achieve by creating an investigatory commission. See
DELORIA, BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES, supra note 9, at 222-26.
188. Cf supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
189. Felix S. Cohen, Remarks, Testimonial Dinner for Felix Cohen, supra note 13, at 22
[hereinafter Cohen, Remarks at Testimonial Dinner]. See also Letter from Felix Cohen to
Joseph Lash (Oct. 26, 1933), supra note 110. Describing an expected tour of Indian
reservations, Cohen noted: "I was to have gone the day before yesterday, but I convinced my
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Alexander Goldenweiser two years after his appointment.190
Read carefully, these statements open a door to exploring the
relationship between Cohen's shifting interpretations of pluralism and
his changing understanding of his own identity as a Jewish American.
Each of the following sections is devoted to a different model:
socialist, systematic, and comparative pluralism. This section begins
by examining Cohen's early attraction to socialist pluralism, the model
that influenced his vision for the IRA. Specifically, I argue that
Cohen's socialist pluralism reflected not only his view of the modem
state, but also his aspirations as a Jewish American to be assimilated
into the body politic of the nation.
New York City, where Cohen was born and raised, certainly
experienced its share of racial tensions during the early decades of the
twentieth century. Yet, like many middle-class Progressives who
came of age amidst heightening social conflict, Cohen was
preoccupied with the struggle of labor against capital and believed that
cultural and ethnic tensions would be resolved once disparities of
wealth and income disappeared. His early writings dealt almost
exclusively with economic issues. 191 He easily saw that law was a tool
of capitalism, but he failed to recognize law's contribution to racial
and cultural hegemony. The attitude of the Socialist Party, whose
ranks he joined, toward race relations was indeed "hazy."', 92 In 1936,
Cohen and his friends composed a Proposed Constitution for the
Socialist Commonwealth of America.193 Its third article guaranteed
that "the right to share in the work of society and to enjoy the product
thereof shall not be denied or curtailed because of race, color, sex,
religion or political or social beliefs."'194 Yet, such fundamental
individual rights were subjected to an overarching socialist pluralist
boss Margold that not knowing anything about the Department or the Indians I'd make a
pretty lousy ambassador. But I'm learning." Id.
190. Letter from Felix Cohen to Alexander Goldenweiser (Apr. 15, 1936), Felix S. Cohen
Papers, Box 1, Folder 7, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale
University.
191. See, e.g., works cited supra note 108.
192. NATHAN IRVIN HUGGINS, THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE 50 (1971). John Buenker more
pointedly noted that Socialists "shared the anti-black biases of white America generally, even
though their animus took the form of neglect and ignorance more often than it did overt
hostility." John Buenker, The New Politics, in 1915, THE CULTURAL MOMENT: THE NEW
POLITICS, THE NEW WOMAN, THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY, THE NEW ART, AND THE NEW THEATER IN
AMERICA 15, 23 (Adele Heller & Lois Rudnick eds., 1991).





structure, with its emphasis on multiple loci of participation and
representation.'
95
What, then, was the appeal of socialist pluralism? Clearly,
Cohen found it intellectually and politically appropriate, but there was
a stronger attraction. The combination of socialism and pluralism was
a central aspect of Cohen's own sense of identity as a Jewish
American and, more important, as an heir to a secular, post-
Enlightenment tradition of Judaism. Cohen's paternal grandparents,
Abraham Mordecai and Bessie Farfel Cohen, immigrated to America
from Minsk, Russia in 1892. Like many first-generation immigrants,
they remained Orthodox, if not in faith at least in ritual. Many second-
generation immigrants, like Felix Cohen's father, Morris Cohen, in
turn, believed that religious Orthodoxy-which for centuries had
required its adherents to separate themselves from the nations of the
world-prevented them from gaining their freedom, and they
zealously rejected it. 196  Instead of embracing the patriarchal
formalism of Orthodoxy, second- and third-generation immigrants
turned to the prophetic tradition whose cry against injustice and search
for eternal truth appealed to Jews and Christians alike. 197  This
prophetic tradition had a strong affinity with the message of
socialism-a socialism that rejected Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and
celebrated solidarity and the improvement of economic conditions, on
the other hand. 198  For young Jewish men and women who were
second- and third-generation Americans, socialism thus provided a
sense of inclusion, of belonging with others in a struggle against
injustice.
Pluralism offered a similar haven. Like other immigrants,
Jewish Americans were torn between their desire to maintain a
particular identity-to be ones-and their eagerness to become
Americans-part of the many. Given the resemblance of Jewish and
American cultural symbols, Jewish immigrants often experienced this
tension more strongly; they had come to America in search of the'
"promised-land," seeking to leave behind a history of segregation and
discrimination. The possibilities that Americans saw in the frontier
195. Id.
196. See A DREAMER'S JOURNEY: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MORRIS R. COHEN 98-99
(1949) [hereinafter MORRIS COHEN, A DREAMER'S JOURNEY].
197. See William S. Berlin, The Roots of Jewish Political Thought in America 222-23
(1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with University Microfilm
International) (referring to Morris R. Cohen, Philosophy in Wartime, An Apologia, NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 3, 1919, reprinted in MORRIS R. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 84 (1946))
[hereinafter MORRIS COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL].
198. See MORRIS COHEN, A DREAMER'S JOURNEY, supra note 196, at 98-99.
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were embedded for Jewish immigrants and their children in the eastern
shores of America. "I am ... grateful," Felix Cohen stated more than
five decades after his father had come to the United States, "grateful
for the opportunity to serve the country that welcomed my father and
my grandparents out of slavery into freedom."
'1 99
Having arrived in America at different historical moments and
from various backgrounds, Jewish Americans attributed a variety of
meanings to the confluence of Jewish and American dreams.2 °° Some
called for assimilation. Others, like Horace Kallen, advocated cultural
pluralism, arguing that America was to remain a nation composed of
many cultural or ethnic nations. 20 1 Between these two ends were
cosmopolitans, who viewed particular cultures, the Jewish culture
being one example, as repositories for insights that when brought
together would allow the development of a more comprehensive
conception of national identity. Cosmopolitans did not suggest that
cultural differences should be eradicated. They objected, however, to
the preservation of such differences in a parochial form, as cultural
pluralism could imply. Instead, they offered a more fluid
understanding of cultural interaction and influence.
202
Felix Cohen grew up in a household committed to
cosmopolitanism. His father, Morris Cohen, espoused the universal
ideals of the Enlightenment and mediated the tensions between
separatism and assimilation by reconstructing the problems of minority
groups as universal rather than particular. There were accordingly
"many human problems, of which Jews, as human beings, [had]
perhaps more than their share. But these problems, traced to their
ultimate roots in reality, [were] also the problems of other minority
groups, and ... [every] ... group of human beings [was] ... a minority
in one situation or another..." 2°3 For Morris, a democracy committed
to social and economic equality was the universal solution to these
problems.
Although intellectually (or philosophically) a pluralist,20 4
Morris Cohen rejected all social forms of pluralism, warning against
199. Cohen, Remarks at Testimonial Dinner, supra note 189, at 25. See also ARTHUR A.
GOREN, THE POLITICS AND PUBLIC CULTURE OF AMERICAN JEWS 13-14 (1999).
200. See generally GOREN, supra note 199, at 13-14.
201. See supra text accompanying note 92.
202. See David A. Hollinger, Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism, and the Emergence of
the American Liberal Intelligentsia, in IN THE AMERICAN PROVINCE: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS 56 (1985).
203. MORRIS COHEN, A DREAMER'S JOURNEY, supra note 196, at 233.




the possible oppressiveness of groups toward their members and
toward society at large-oppressiveness that could potentially follow
from either political or cultural pluralism. "We can draw more than
one true picture of the social world, provided we do not claim that our
picture is the true one," he wrote in a critique of Harold Laski's
political pluralism. 205 Jews, he similarly argued in a critique of Horace
Kallen's cultural pluralism, adopted the "very popular racial
philosophy of history"-that is, "the constant tendency to emphasize
the consciousness of race"-but "[i]nstead of the Teuton, it is the Jew
that is the pure or superior race. 2 °6
Felix Cohen was intrigued by cultural and political pluralism.
To advocate any form of pluralism, however, would have been
perceived as a rebellion against Morris's intellectual authority. To
adopt cultural pluralism would have, in addition, challenged Felix's
own sense of identity as a Jewish American, particularly his desire to
be accepted into the polity. Devoted to his father, intellectually and
personally, Felix Cohen could thus go only as far as adopting socialist
pluralism, an approach that bridged Harold Laski's political pluralism
(by describing groups as sovereigns) and Morris Cohen's critique of it
(by endorsing centralized planning). Felix Cohen's attraction to
socialist pluralism, in short, was motivated by his wish, as a Jewish
American and as the son of Morris Cohen, to minimize the
significance of racial and ethnic differences. With this in mind, it was
easier to assume that Indian tribes were political groups, not ethnic or
cultural ones. Such was Cohen's belief when he joined the
Department of the Interior to help draft the IRA.207
Cohen's belief that the IRA should establish on Indian
reservations American-style governments was rooted not only in a
particular vision of the modem state, but also in his understanding of
individual and group identity. His socialist pluralist model was an
attempt to create a universal economic, if not also political, structure
on Indian reservations almost to the extent of forced assimilation. As
already noted, ultimately, Cohen articulated a different model of
205. Morris R. Cohen, Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy, 16 J.
PHIL. 673 (1919), reprinted in MORRIS R. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
MEANING OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 386, 399 (1931). For Harold Laski's political pluralism, see
also supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
206. Morris R. Cohen, Zionism: Tribalism or Liberalism?, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 19,
1919, reprinted in MORRIS COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL, supra note 197, at 326, 328. The
article was written as a critique of Zionism, which Morris Cohen associated with Horace
Kallen's pluralism. For Horace Kallen's cultural pluralism, see also supra text accompanying
note 92.
207. See supra section III.B.
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pluralism: comparative pluralism; it accepted that all groups, including
ethnic and religious groups, had the right to self-determination. The
following sections explore the relationship between Cohen's shifting
interpretations of pluralism and his changing conceptions of identity.
B. Interlude: Systems and Cosmopolitanism
Cohen came to the New Deal to promote tribal self-
government. His experience in drafting and administering the IRA, as
well as the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, helped to shift his focus
from sovereignty to racial discrimination. In the late 1930s, Cohen no
longer believed that racial tensions would disappear once social or
political conflicts were resolved. Having realized the diversity of
Indian customs, traditions, and constitutions, Cohen articulated his
ideal of systematic pluralism.
Unlike socialist pluralism, which imagined the state as
composed of multiple loci of participation and representation,
systematic pluralism focused on the role of the state in bringing about
social and cultural integration. It assumed that the American legal
system could encompass all particular value systems. Still, while
opposing the forced assimilation of all cultural systems into a
homogenous mass, systematic pluralism envisioned all systems
becoming a cosmopolitan one.20 The reasons for such an "in-
between" approach, I wish to suggest, reached back to Cohen's own
sense of identity as a Jewish American.
Like his model of socialist pluralism, Cohen's attempt to
articulate a universal (or legal) ideal that would include all particular
systems was meant to accommodate not only the rights of Indian tribes
to bring their particular values into the polity, but also the interests of
other groups to have their different needs accommodated. Indeed, in
the late 1930s and early 1940s, as European Jews were facing ever
expanding economic, political, and physical sanctions, Cohen drew on
his ideal of systematic pluralism to criticize exclusionary immigration
laws, laws that barred refugees from finding a haven within America's
borders. Challenging nativist arguments, Cohen emphasized the
important contributions of immigrants to the social and economic
208. See supra section III.C.
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welfare of the country, and he urged the admission of European
209refugees into the body politic of the nation.
In Cohen's writings on the problem of exclusionary
immigration laws, one can clearly see the interdependence of theories
of pluralism and conceptions of identity. In these works, Cohen
sought to extend his pluralist approach beyond labor unions and Indian
tribes to ethnic communities, especially to Jewish immigrants. Yet,
his works on immigration laws referred to European rather than Jewish
refugees, an evasion that reflected not only Cohen's political concerns
about anti-Semitism, but also his continuing ambivalence toward
Horace Kallen's cultural pluralism. 210 While his experience in
administering the IRA led Cohen, the lawyer for Indian tribes, to
accept the plurality of cultural systems (celebrating the particular
heritage of every group was the premise of his systematic pluralism),
his eagerness as a Jewish American to be admitted into the polity, as
well as the cosmopolitanism he inherited from his father, continued to
limit the scope of his approach. Cohen's model of systematic
pluralism rejected separatism and instead sought to articulate a
universal ideal of social and cultural integration-a conception of
collective rights.
Let me reiterate my argument. Cohen's encounters with Indian
tribes led him to recognize a multiplicity of value systems. His ideal
of systematic pluralism was thus an attempt to encourage social and
cultural integration. Because for Cohen-the pluralist, but also the
Jewish American, who was in the 1940s struggling to keep American
borders open to European refugees-both the possibility of inclusion
and the role of the sovereign in battling racial discrimination were
vital, his systematic pluralist ideal also stressed the role of the state in
bringing about social and cultural integration.
"The victim of economic oppression may be buoyed up in the
struggle by the hope that he can improve his economic status," Cohen
wrote in 1940.211 "[T]he victim of political oppression may change his
political affiliation," and "[t]he victim of religious oppression," Cohen
wished to believe, "may embrace the religion of his oppressors. '" 212
Yet, "[t]he victim of racial persecution," could not "change his
209. FELIX S. COHEN, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE (League for Industrial
Democracy Pamphlet Series, 1940), condensed as Exclusionary Immigration Laws, 3
CONTEMP. JEWISH REC. 141 (1940).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
211. Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 166, at 185.
212. Id.
438 [VOL. 1:393
2001] PLURALISMS: THE INDIAN NEW DEAL AS A MODEL
race." 213 "For these victims," Cohen proclaimed, there was "no
sanctuary and no escape. 214
To be integrated into the polity, victims of racial and ethnic
persecutions, according to Cohen, needed the protection of the
sovereign. His analysis thus suggested that "since all the minority
groups that [had] reason to fear discriminatory legislation [made] up
together a great majority of [the] population," at "the heart of our
democratic institutions" was an asserted right (of individuals and
215groups) to be immune from racial discrimination. According to
Cohen, the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution 16 endorsed this asserted right.217 "[T]he right to be
immune from racial discrimination by governmental agencies," Nathan
Margold similarly wrote in the introduction to Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, "is an essential part of the fabric of democratic
government in the United States. 21 8
As I hope to have shown, socialist pluralism and systematic
pluralism reflected both Cohen's political and his personal aspirations.
Nothing, however, better illustrates the interdependence of theories of
pluralism and Cohen's sense of identity than his writings in the mid-
1940s in support of his ideal of comparative pluralism and the ICCA.
C. Comparison and Coexistence
Cohen's ideal of comparative pluralism, which he began to
articulate in the aftermath of the Second World War, celebrated
cultural pluralism and embraced dialogue as a foundation for
coexistence. As already noted, by the mid-1940s, Cohen's faith in the
ability of experts to develop a pluralistic society declined. Instead, his
writings focused on the ability of individuals and groups to actualize
their destiny. He devised the Indian Claims Commission in the hopes
of encouraging deliberation as a means of reconciliation and
commemoration. 2 19 Cohen's comparative pluralism and his belief in
the feasibility of communication as a means of resolving ethnic
conflicts, I wish now to suggest, reflected not only a particular vision
213. Id.
214. Id. Cf Kallen, Democracy Versus the Melting-Pot, supra note 92.
215. Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 166, at 185.
216. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
217. Cohen, Indian Rights, supra note 166, at 191; see also Cohen, Colonialism: A
Realistic Approach, supra note 166.
218. Nathan R. Margold, Introduction to HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra
note 16, at x. The Introduction was signed by Margold but likely drafted by Cohen.
219. See supra section III.D.
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of the state, but more deeply, Cohen's serious concerns-as a Jewish
American-about the events in Europe and their potential
ramifications in the United States.
Throughout the 1930s, Cohen's different interpretations of
pluralism offered internal critiques of the American way of life. Yet,
like many Jewish intellectuals of his generation, Cohen was
determined to rebut comparisons between the history of race relations
in America and totalitarianism in Europe. His writings in the mid-
1940s thus sought to defend what he described as "[tihe common
beliefs that have held us together as a nation, the moral and intellectual
foundations of our democracy" against "sustained attacks from
totalitarian quarters." 220 In a series of articles that he published in the
early 1940s, and in a handbook on totalitarian propaganda that he
coauthored with several colleagues, 22' Cohen called attention to the
American democratic achievements in the field of minority rights.
"The propaganda assaults of Nazism, Fascism and Communism have
been skillfully organized and lavishly financed," Cohen wrote in the
foreword to Combating Totalitarian Propaganda.222 "With complete
disregard for the canons of ordinary decency and honesty, the
purveyors of totalitarian propaganda have insidiously and persistently
sought to undermine loyalty to the American way of life."22
Seeking to combat totalitarian propaganda, Cohen's writings
during the mid-1940s, particularly his work on the ICCA, similarly
ventured into propagandist aims. In January 1946-anticipating the
passage of the ICCA in the late summer of 1946-Cohen published an
article that baffled his colleagues. Titled How We Bought the United
224States, it stressed the "historic fact ... that practically all of the real
220. Felix S. Cohen, Foreword to COMBATING TOTALITARIAN PROPAGANDA: A LEGAL
APPRAISAL i (Felix S. Cohen ed., 1944) [hereinafter Cohen et al., COMBATING TOTALITARIAN
PROPAGANDA]. This work originally appeared as three articles: Felix S. Cohen & Edith
Lowenstein, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Suppression, 37 ILL. L.
REv. 193 (1944); James E. Curry, Felix S. Cohen & Bernard M. Newburg, Combating
Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of Exposure, 10 U. CHI. L. REv. 107 (1943); and Lucy
M. Kramer & Felix S. Cohen, Combating Totalitarian Propaganda: The Method of
Enlightenment, 27 MINN. L. REv* 545 (1943). The studies were carried out by the Institute of
Living Law, "a non-profit agency engaged in socio-legal research in the problems of
democracy." Cohen et al., COMBATING TOTALITARIAN PROPAGANDA, supra, at 8.
221. Cohen et al., COMBATING TOTALITARIAN PROPAGANDA: A LEGAL APPRAISAL, supra
note 220.
222. Id. at i.
223. Id.
224. Felix S. Cohen,'How We Bought the United States, COLLIER'S, Jan. 19, 1946, at 22
[hereinafter Cohen, How We Bought the United States], reprinted with adaptation in Felix S.
Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28 (1947) [hereinafter Cohen, Original Indian
Title], reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 273, 279-88. The material was
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estate acquired by the United States since 1776 was purchased not
from Napoleon or any other emperor or czar but from its original
,,225Indian owners. In a paragraph that was omitted in the original
publication, Cohen emphasized that the record of dealings with Indians
had its dark pages: Americans had driven "hard Yankee bargains";
they often did not make the payments they promised; they did not
always respect the boundaries of lands that the Indians reserved to
themselves or other promises they made to the Indians in return for
their land. Yet, Cohen stressed, whenever Congress was apprised of
such deviations, "it [had] generally been willing to submit to court
decisions the claims of any injured Indian tribe. And ... to make
whatever restitution the facts supported for wrongs committed by
blundering or unfaithful public servants. 226 No nation, Cohen
proclaimed, had "set for itself so high a standard of dealing with a
native aboriginal people," or had been "more self-critical in seeking to
rectify its deviations from those high standards."
227
Many criticized Cohen for downplaying the darker side of
America's dealings with Indian tribes.228  "I might be disposed to
wonder whether you have not placed too high a value upon the goods
and services with which we have supplied the Indians in certain
circumstances," Harold Ickes wrote to Cohen.229 "I wonder," Ickes
added, "whether you have not been too optimistic in your averments as
to our fairness. ' 23° Having known Cohen to be "more disposed to
discover wrongs and insist upon their being righted" than to take "a
complaisant point of view," Ickes concluded, nonetheless, that "the
article was a good one., 231 "I only hope," he noted, "that our record is
as fair as you present it."
232
Cohen knew that the ideals he ascribed to American society
were not always carried out. "I probably overstated the high standards
embodied in our treaties and statutes," he confessed to Ickes, and the
also presented in a speech to the Indian Rights Association. Letter from Felix Cohen to John
Collier, United Nations Assembly, England (Jan. 11, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 65,
Folder 1041, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
225. Cohen, Original Indian Title, supra note 224, at 280.
226. Id. at 288.
227. Id.
228. See generally correspondence in Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box 65, Folder 1041, Yale
Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University. For a recent critique,
see Aviam Soifer, Descent, 29 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 269, 269-71 (2001).
229. Letter from Harold Ickes to Felix Cohen (Jan. 17, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box






omission of darker paragraphs by the editors created an even more
exaggerated picture. Perhaps, Cohen added, "twelve years among
the bureaucrats have made me less astute to criticize our Indian record
than I should be.",
234
Let me suggest that not bureaucracy, but rather professional,
intellectual, and personal reasons dictated Cohen's approach. As a
government lawyer, his goal was to counteract opposition to "righting
Indian wrongs"; he wanted to offset objections that were raised against
the pending ICCA, and that were often founded, according to Cohen,
"on the mistaken idea that we have consistently robbed the Indians of
all they owned and that laying down any higher standard of public
conduct now would be unprecedented, revolutionary, and terribly
expensive."2 35 "[B]y bringing to public attention some of the better
side of our Indian dealings," he hoped to put the "program ... for
general Indian claims legislation in a more appealing setting." 236 At
any rate, Cohen concluded his letter to Ickes, perhaps "even an over-
optimistic commentary on the high standards set by our Indian
legislation may prove helpful in arousing critical attention to lapses
from those standards. 237
Furthermore, Cohen wrote the article How We Bought the
United States to support his ideal of comparative pluralism. He
wanted his audience to recognize that throughout American history,
Indians were neither slaves nor victims; they were active agents,
indeed sovereign peoples, with histories, traditions, and legal systems
of their own, coexisting with the American system. They accepted the
presence of non-Indians, they were capable of dealing with them, and
they protected their own interests.238 In Cohen's opinion, the fact that
233. Letter from Felix Cohen to Harold Ickes (Jan. 22, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box





238. Cohen's writings in the mid-1940s indeed suggested that Indians were fortunate to
have their needs recorded in abundant treaties. The different legal rules to which tribes were
sometimes subjected, Cohen stressed, were the fruits of treaties, contracts, and statutes that
Indians were able to secure from the federal government. The peculiar status of Indian tribes
was thus not a diminution of full citizenship (a claim, which, according to Cohen, bureaucrats
used to defend the erosion of such unique rights in order to make Indians "equal" citizens).
Rather, it was an addition to full citizenship. Felix S. Cohen, Indians Are Citizens, 1 AM.
INDIAN 12 (1944), reprinted in THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE, supra note 13, at 253. Cohen
emphasized that without the recognition of Indian rights by earlier generations, there would
have been no problem of Indian claims. Wrongs never create rights, he wrote. Indeed,
according to Cohen, there was "no problem of Negro Claims for the uncompensated labors of
two and one-half centuries of slavery, because the Negroes had no legal rights during the
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Indians were able to deal with American settlers suggested that
dialogue and translation between different legal systems were
possible-that his ideal of comparative pluralism was viable.
As a government lawyer working on behalf of Indian tribes,
Cohen wanted to believe that his plans for the ICCA and his model of
comparative pluralism, more broadly, were feasible. Yet, he wrote the
article How We Bought the United States to prove another fact:
Cohen-the Jewish American-wanted to demonstrate to Americans,
and to those outside the United States, that American society could not
succumb to totalitarianism, that it had already chosen comparative
pluralism over totalitarianism.
"I have written up the story of 'How we Bought the United
States,"' Cohen wrote to the editors of Collier's, "in not too technical
terms and illustrated the piece with a map of the United States showing
the various Indian cessions.' 239 Amidst growing concerns about the
treatment of minority groups, Cohen noted, he wanted to call attention
to "the story of our land dealings with the Indians, 24 ° especially as
most Americans were "quite unfamiliar with the basic facts on this
subject and [accepted] without question the myth that Indian land
rights were ruthlessly disregarded in the growth of our country."
24 1
Publishing the piece, Cohen further believed, should help in the
war against totalitarian propaganda. "Possibly," he wrote to John
Collier, who was then at the United Nations Assembly in England,
"this piece will help you, as an American diplomat abroad, to live
down the bad name of the United States in the field of native
affairs., 242 At least, Cohen hoped, it would refute the assertions of
"Jap, Nazi and Fascist propagandists [who] lost no time in pointing out
that what their countries were doing in Asia, Africa and Europe was
not different from what the United States did years ago in taking a
continent from the Indians in the name of a superior race., 243 "This is
period of slavery." Cohen, Indian Claims, supra note 183, at 268. In Cohen's opinion, the
fact that Indian claims were considered a "problem" indicated not only that wrongs had been
committed against Indians, but also "that Indians [had] always occupied a high and protected
position in the law of the land." Id.
239. Letter from Felix Cohen to Editors of Collier's (Jan. 26, 1945), Felix S. Cohen




242. Letter from Felix Cohen to John Collier, United Nations Assembly, England (Jan.
11, 1946), supra note 224.
243. Cohen, How We Bought the United States, supra note 224, at 22.
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the way so much else about Indians and about all dependent peoples
244
could be put across," Collier replied with approval.
With the events in Europe, on the one hand, and growing
opposition to federal Indian policy, on the other hand, Cohen wrote the
article How We Bought the United States to refute totalitarian
propaganda outside the United States as well as racial antagonism-
against Indians, blacks, Jews, or any other cultural group-in America.
He wanted Americans to adopt his ideal of comparative pluralism,
with its emphasis on dialogue and coexistence, as the only alternative
to totalitarianism.
As early as 1924, Horace Kallen indicated that "[t]he
alternative before Americans [was] Kultur Klux Klan or Cultural
Pluralism., 245 The latter, according to Kallen, was possible "only in a
democratic society whose institutions encourage individuality in
groups, in persons, in temperaments, whose program liberates these
individualities and guides them into a fellowship of freedom and
cooperation. ' '246 Faced with totalitarianism in Europe, and growing
critiques of the Indian New Deal at home, Kallen's pointed alternative
became for Cohen-the lawyer, the pluralist, and the Jewish
American-a matter of life and death. He needed to believe that
Americans had already chosen between Kallen's alternatives-that
they preferred cultural pluralism, or what he developed into
comparative pluralism, to Kultur Klux Klan, and democracy to
totalitarianism.
Establishing American standards was the aim both of How We
Bought the United States and of the ICCA. In a world where victims
were many, where force and violence abundant, where genocide
became an aspect of modernity, the preservation of diverse cultures
seemed the only alternative to total annihilation. By suggesting that
Indian tribes-the original owners of America-reached agreements to
preserve their traditions with immigrants to the new world, Cohen
hoped to demonstrate the feasibility of his ideal of comparative
pluralism, an ideal that endorsed cultural pluralism not as a
justification for separatism, but as grounds for dialogue and inclusion.
By emphasizing the success of earlier cultural dialogues, Cohen hoped
to provide an incentive for agreements in postwar America: between
"whites" and "reds"; between old inhabitants and European
244. Letter from John Collier to Felix Cohen (Jan. 18, 1946), Felix S. Cohen Papers, Box
65, Folder 1041, Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Library, Yale University.
245. Horace M. Kallen, Postscript-To Be Read First-Culture and the Ku Klux Klan, in
KALLEN, CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 92, at 9, 43.
246. Id.
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immigrants; these agreements may even be made globally. In the
aftermath of the Second World War, Indian tribes taught Cohen what
he rejected in 1933, but was willing to admit in 1946-that the




As if admitting the relationship between his work on federal
Indian law, his interpretations of pluralism, and his shifting
conceptions of identity, in 1949, two years after he left the Department
of the Interior, Cohen concluded a commentary on Indian self-
government with the following paragraph:
The issue we face is not the issue merely of whether
Indians will regain their independence of spirit. Our
interest in Indian self-government today is not the
interest of sentimentalists or antiquarians. We have a
vital concern with Indian self-government because the
Indian is to America what the Jew was to the Russian
Czars and Hitler's Germany. For us, the Indian tribe is
the miners' canary and when it flutters and droops we
know that the poison gasses of intolerance threaten all
other minorities in our land. And who of us is not a
member of some minority?
248
When Cohen used the image of the miners' canary, the Indian
New Deal was already under growing attack. As the Cold War
spurred mounting attacks on anything remotely socialist, "Making
'Reds' of the Indians" was no longer a symbol of reform. Rather,
federal Indian policy during the New Deal was described as a threat to
American ideals. Beginning in the 1940s, the IRA was criticized as
"promoting communistic tendencies and imposing an unwanted
primitive tribal state on developing Indians who desired to
247. Throughout the early twentieth century, many second- and third-generation
European immigrants, who were "upwardly mobile and ready to cast off the immigrant past,"
nonetheless, "sought to maintain their ethnic identity, which they reinforced by creating
Americanized forms of traditional institutions." LYNN DUMENIL, THE MODERN TEMPER:
AMERICAN CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE 1920s, at 253 (1995).
248. Indian Self Government, supra note 142, at 313-14.
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assimilate. ' '249 Instead of "a device for Indians to rebuild their
shattered communities through local, tribal economic and political
organizations," the Indian New Deal was rapidly seen as "an
impediment toward Indian economic and political assimilation. '" 250
Opposition to the Indian New Deal was motivated by a variety
of reasons, including a desire to obtain Indian lands and resources,
objections to Indian religious practices, and the depiction of federal
Indian policy during the New Deal as "socialistic." Opponents urged
the federal government to discontinue its role as trustee of Indians'
property. Protective guardianship, it was argued, could be detrimental
to individual welfare. "Development of the property to full utilization
and encouragement of the owner to accept responsibility for
management" were offered as better goals of Indian policy.25'
As political pressures to change federal Indian policy
increased, the group of reformers that drafted and administered the
Indian New Deal fell apart. Collier resigned in 1945, followed by
Ickes, who left the Truman Cabinet in February 1946. On December
15, 1947, Cohen sent his letter of resignation to then Secretary of the
Interior, Julius A. Krug. 2  "You will resign when your freedom ... is
249. Clinton, supra note 23, at 105-06.
250. Id.
251. Michaels, supra note 72, at 1578-79 (quoting Report of Commissioner of Indian
Affairs John R. Nichols (June 30, 1949), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED
STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 975 (Wilcomb E. Washburn ed., 1973)). Michael Walch
has divided the objections to the Indian New Deal into two groups: ideological and economic.
Ideological opponents stressed that Indians' communal ownership of property contradicted the
American liberal ideal of private ownership of property; that Indians' religious practices,
which were encouraged by the IRA, promoted heathenism; and that the BIA's control on
many reservations denied freedom to individual Indians. According to these opponents, to
make Indians "equal citizens," these aspects had to be changed. Opponents who emphasized
economic grounds stressed the growing competition for natural resources in the postwar years
and urged the opening up of Indian lands for private development. The committee responsible
for Indian affairs in Congress included many members from Western states, where the
pressure from developers and private businesses was particularly insistent. It is important to
recognize, however, that objection to the IRA did not come only from non-Indians. Some
Indians wished to escape the pervasive control of the BIA. Assimilated Indians, in turn,
wanted a share of tribal resources. Only a minority of Indians, nonetheless, supported
termination. Michael C. Walch, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35 STAN. L. REv.
1181, 1185-86 nn. 24-25 (1983).
252. Cohen wrote:
When I came to work for Interior in October of 1933 it was with the
expectation that I would finish, in a year or so, the work I came to do, and
then return to private practice and teaching. The many kindnesses that
have been extended to me in this work by my colleagues, and its
fascinating variety and never-ending opportunities for defense of the
public interest, have made leaving very difficult. I have now overstayed
my appointed tour of duty by thirteen years and, I fear, largely outlived
my usefulness in the Department.
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253denied," Norman Thomas told Cohen back in 1933. In 1947, with
other disillusioned New Deal colleagues, as well as like-minded
Indians, Cohen came to realize that he would be able to better assist
the Indian cause by representing tribes against the government.
254
Within a few years, termination became official government policy,
aiming to end the special status of Indian tribes.255 As Judith Royster
has recently noted, it was "assimilation with a vengeance" 256:
"Congress withdrew federal recognition, liquidated tribal assets,
including the land base, and transferred jurisdiction over Indians to the
states. The loss of tribal territory and sovereignty was immediate and
complete. 257
The 1950s also witnessed the emergence of a new theory of
pluralism: a process theory that sought to create a conception of a
neutral political process, free of any substantive commitment to
particular values, in which different groups interact, compete, and
trade ends.258  This new theory of pluralism-interest group
pluralism-was inspired, as Edward Purcell showed, by a rejection of
all absolutism including any morally-based pleas for social reform.
The American ideal of democracy became a balancing theory.
America was composed of interest groups, and group conflict reflected
the dispersal of political power. Furthermore, the delicate balance
between groups was presumed to be preserved by existing political
institutions and cultural consensus, a "consensus rooted in the common
life, habits, institutions, and experience of generations." 259 The status
quo became a normative theory.
260
Like federal Indian policy during the New Deal, interest group
pluralism reflected and helped to shape a particular vision of the
Cohen, Remarks at Testimonial Dinner, supra note 189, at 19.
253. Letter from Norman Thomas to Felix Cohen (Nov. 14, 1933), supra note 109.
254. D'arcy McNickle, Remarks, Testimonial Dinner for Felix Cohen, supra note 13, at
13-14. After his resignation and until his death in 1953, Cohen acted as consultant to a
consortium of law firms that pooled their resources to explore legal questions common to
tribal claims. See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS WHITE JUSTICE: THE SIOUX NATION
VERSUS THE UNITED STATES, 1775 TO THE PRESENT 218 (1991).
255. House Concurrent Resolution 108, Aug. 1, 1953; see also DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 14, at 234.
256. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy ofAllotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1, 18 (1995).
257. Id.; see also Walch, supra note 251, at 1182-86.
258. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY]; ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1967) [hereinafter DAHL, PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY]; see also Horwitz, supra note 1, at 251-58.
259. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 255 (1973).
260. See generally id. at 253-66.
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modem, pluralistic state. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century,
legal scholars have attempted to develop a pluralistic polity-to
articulate policies that would accommodate diverse social, economic,
cultural, and religious interests. Many adopted one system of beliefs
and treated it as the primary guiding light in their endeavors. For
example, in the 1930s, many legal realists relied on some form of
"policy analysis," assuming that "there were correct-liberal-
answers to the hot legal questions of the day but that conservative
judges couldn't be expected to reach them." 261 In the 1950s, interest
group pluralists adopted a different approach. Instead of endorsing
any particular vision of the public good, these process theorists
directed their efforts toward finding a "morality of process"
independent of results.262 This turn to process attracted criticism,
however, from those who saw law as necessarily embracing
substantive norms.263 More recently, critical legal studies scholars, the
new institutional economists, and feminist legal theorists, to name a
few groups, have sought to direct legal discourses away from process
and toward substance. 264 The concurrent resurgence of formalism
265
keeps the debates alive. In this context, the story of the Indian New
Deal is of enduring importance.
Inspired by early twentieth-century normative theories of
pluralism, each of the models Cohen devised was an attempt to
accommodate diverse interests without either promoting certain moral
absolutes or succumbing to moral relativism. Cohen's ideal of
socialist pluralism, which informed his plans for the IRA, urged the
distribution of sovereignty to political groups, including Indian tribes,
as a means of encouraging group self-determination. His ideal of
systematic pluralism envisioned the inclusion of diverse cultural
traditions under an all-encompassing (universal) legal system. Finally,
Cohen's ideal of comparative pluralism, which was already reflected
in his hopes for the ICCA, emphasized the possibility of exchange
between and among different value systems. Realizing that
policymakers might never be able to articulate a universal ideal that
would endorse all particular systems, comparative pluralism was an
261. KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 88.
262. See, e.g., DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 258; DAHL,
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 258.
263. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Themes, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
264. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed.
1998) (1982).
265. See, e.g., Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 527 (1999).
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attempt to find legal mechanisms that would allow the coexistence of
distinct value systems.
These models were not perfect. Indeed, they failed on Indian
reservations. The IRA ended up imposing a universal structure of
government on all reservations, while the ICCA was hardly more than
symbolic in its remedies. The significance of Cohen's experience in
the New Deal reaches, however, beyond the ultimate successes or
failures of the policies he devised. Cohen's models of pluralism and
his experience in the New Deal, more broadly, vividly illustrate the
relationship between images of the state, conceptions of identity, and
laws seeking to accommodate a plurality of interests. Taken as a
whole, the story of the Indian New Deal provides a model for critically
thinking about theoretical and personal constraints that continue to
impede attempts to devise a pluralistic polity. Let me conclude,
however, not with constraints, but with possibilities.
Cohen's encounters with Indian tribes helped to transform his
understanding of law, pluralism, and identity. His story illustrates how
policymaking can benefit from -such encounters and from similar
interactions and dialogues. A commitment to pluralism is political,
intellectual, and personal. It requires an admission that the diverse
cultural, political, and social interests that characterize our society are
grounded in multiple value systems; and it requires faith in the
possibility of social integration, inside and outside the law. The
endorsement of all pluralities and differences as morally and
politically valid is impossible. Still, in order to devise a pluralistic
polity, we must make diversity the starting point for reflection and
action, and we must aim to discern-through dialogue and
communication-universal principles that can yield a point of view
266acceptable to all. Our treatment of different groups (and
individuals), as Cohen so aptly described it, is the litmus test of our
democracy; it reflects "a set of beliefs that forms the intellectual
equipment of a generation., 267 It is up to us to develop the content of
such beliefs.
266. See Benhabib, supra note 166, at 81; HILARY PUTNAM, WORDS AND LIFE 185-86
(James Conant ed., 1994) (arguing that pluralism does not deny a universal ethics).
267. Cohen, Author's Acknowledgment, supra note 167, at xviii.
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